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ADMIRALTY AND THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
DavidJ Bederman*
This Article considers a constitutional curiosity, one that has sur-
prising and significant ramifications for the balance of power between
states and the federal courts. The Eleventh Amendment to the Con-
stitution, ratified on February 7, 1795, provides that "the Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State."'
I take as the starting point for my inquiry the proposition that the
Adopters of the Eleventh Amendment, like the Framers2 of the Con-
stitution and Bill of Rights ratified eight and six years before, were
careful drafters. They knew how to choose their words. They knew
the differences between the great divisions in Anglo-American law and
jurisdiction and were prepared to make important legal distinctions
based on those differences. The Framers, for example, distinguished
between actions in law and equity and granted jury trials for the for-
mer and not the latter.3
Why, then did the drafters of the Eleventh Amendment refer only
to suits "in law or equity" when they were crafting their grant of immu-
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia (1996-97).
Associate Professor of Law, Emory University.
I am grateful for the comments of many of my colleagues and collaborators,
particularlyJohn Harrison, Peter Hess, Paul Keller, and George Rutherglen. Thanks
also for the superb research assistance of Philip J. Bauer, Emory Law class of 1996.
All heresies and expurgations are my fault.
1 U.S. CONST. amend. XI (emphasis added).
2 In this Article, I will use the phrase "Adopters" to refer specifically to the mem-
bers of Congress who proposed, and the state legislators who ratified, the Eleventh
Amendment. I will refer to the "Framers" as including the entire generation of politi-
cians who drafted, ratified, and implemented in practice the Constitution of 1787.
3 See U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In suits at common law.., the right to trial by
jury shall be. preserved."). This provision was explicitly disallowed for admiralty mat-
ters. See Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446-47 (1830); see also U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2, cl. I ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity
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nity to states from suit in federal court? Why weren't admiralty cases
mentioned, even though the Framers regarded them as a special class
of litigation, distinct from actions in law or equity?4 Did they just for-
get about admiralty? Did they care? Or did they, as I propose here,
purposefully exclude admiralty cases from the grant of immunity to
states from suit in federal courts? I believe the Adopters had good
cause for wanting states to be amenable to at least some kinds of suits
in admiralty in federal court, particularly in rem proceedings asserted
against property in which a state may have had an interest as a claim-
ant. Yet these concerns have become obscured with time and the
shifting currents of the United States Supreme Court's state sovereign
immunity jurisprudence and its interpretations of the Eleventh
Amendment. This Article addresses silence in a constitutional text
and assigns reasons for unspoken assumptions.
The Eleventh Amendment, whatever construction or gloss might
be applied to its textual terms (and there have been many), clearly
indicated an intent to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts over
suits in which states were named as defendants without their consent.
Yet there have been two stories accounting for the principle of sover-
eign immunity enshrined in the Eleventh Amendment. One is that
state sovereign immunity in the federal courts preexisted the Framing,
was implied by Article III of the Constitution, intentionally subverted
by the Supreme Court's 1793 decision in Chisolm v. Georgia,5 and was
restored by the Eleventh Amendment. The other story explains the
Eleventh Amendment as merely a technical correction to the grant of
federal court jurisdiction in Article III, which otherwise allowed com-
petence over "Controversies ... between a State and Citizens of an-
other State . . . [and] between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. '6
Explanations of the Eleventh Amendment are thus extraordina-
rily anti-textual in their thrust. The Amendment may mean more
than what it says and thus extend principles of state sovereign immu-
nity. Or it may mean rather less than what was intended. 7 Today, the
Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence has been virtu-
ally captured by a teleological gloss on the text which extols inchoate
principles of state sovereign immunity with no serious consideration
given to either the text of the Amendment or to the best evidence of
4 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend... to all
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction . ).
5 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
6 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cls. 5 & 8.
7 See Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102
HARv. L. REV. 1342 (1989).
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the Adopting generation's intent. This is a surprising constitutional
interpretation for a Court that is strongly originalist in its construction
of other, equally significant clauses of the Constitution, and is gener-
ally textual or literal with the rest of the document.
The gravity of this will not be lost on those who recognize that the
Eleventh Amendment has become the bulwark principle of federalism
for the Rehnquist Court. Its significance has surely eclipsed the desul-
tory but well publicized limits the Court has placed on Congress's
power to legislate imposed by the Commerce Clause8 or the Tenth
Amendment.9 The Eleventh Amendment's power to refashion feder-
alism is, of course, one of directing the proper forum in which to file a
suit against a state. By excluding the jurisdiction of the federal courts
for such suits, review can only be had in the U.S. Supreme Court by
way of exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction from the final decisions
of a state's highest tribunal. 10 Such review is limited, moreover, to
only those decisions implicating rights under the federal Constitution,
statutes, or treaties. Most significantly of all, the Supreme Court has
just ruled in Seminole Tribe v. Florida" that Congress has no power to
strip a state of its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal
court, except as pursuant to its power under section five of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
The significance of the Eleventh Amendment to our constitu-
tional scheme of federal government requires a renewed considera-
tion of its text and of the Adopters' original intent. The first Part of
this Article will consider the period of the framing of the Constitution
and prevalent attitudes towards sovereign immunity and admiralty ju-
risdiction. In Part II, I will carefully address the constitutional history
leading to the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment and the extent
8 See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
9 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
10 See McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, Dep't of
Bus. Regulation, 496 U.S. 18, 30-31 (1990); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
264 (1821). But see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1131 n.14 (1996)
(Rehnquist, C.J.) (suggesting that the Supreme Court might not have supervisory ju-
risdiction over cases coming up from a state supreme court, absent a defendant state's
consent). Cf. id. at 1151 n.10 (SouterJ., dissenting) (noting that there should be no
difference between an "appeal" to the U.S. Supreme Court from a state supreme
court, as distinct from a suit originally filed in federal court). For more on this sub-
ject, see Henry Paul Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity "Exception," 110 HARv. L. REv.
102, 125-26 (1996) (discussing Supreme Court's holding in Reich v. Collins, 115 S. Ct.
547, 549 (1994), which suggested that states must provide remedies in state courts if
they are to insist on immunity in federal court); Carlos Manuel Vgtzquez, What is Eev-
enth Amendment Immunity? Seminole v. McKesson, 106 YALE LJ. 1683 (1997).
11 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
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to which Chisolm and the adoption debates contemplated its applica-
tion to admiralty. Part III traces the evolution of the original under-
standing that the Eleventh Amendment did not apply to certain
admiralty actions through a series of Supreme Court decisions in the
early 1800s. How this comprehension unravelled in the extraordinary
revolution affecting all doctrines of sovereign immunity in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries will be narrated in Part IV.
The legacy of this revolution can still be felt in Eleventh Amend-
ment jurisprudence today, and despite attempts to return to a more
originalist understanding of the Amendment, courts have continued
to expand its reach, barring admiralty cases from federal court juris-
diction in ways that earlier would never have been contemplated.
This process will be assessed in Part V, particularly in the context of
disputes regarding sunken shipwrecks. Part VI summarizes the juris-
prudential options available in immunizing states from admiralty ac-
tions in federal court, and attempts to restore the understandings of
the Adopters, while also being faithful to the new currents in sover-
eign immunity jurisprudence.
Finally, I offer a conclusion suggesting that the convoluted his-
tory of admiralty and the Eleventh Amendment, far from being margi-
nal or irrelevant to the balance of power between states and the
federal courts, is actually central to that dispute. Part of the intellec-
tual exercise of this Article is an evaluation of the judicial appreciation
of the Amendment in the period before its interpretation was revolu-
tionized by such decisions as Hans v. Louisiana'2 and its paradoxically
logical counterpart, Ex parte Young,8 both of which were strikingly
anti-textual and indifferent to originalist concerns. To the extent that
the admiralty cases parallel the wider problems of federal judicial au-
thority over states, they provide a powerful and comprehensible para-
digm for solving this essential equation of federalism.
Textualism and originalism are, however, an incomplete antidote
to the strange ailment that has afflicted current Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence. An historicist approach must be sensitive, also, to the
broader values of constitutional government, which can include feder-
alism, sovereign immunity, and a willingness to immunize states from
certain sorts of interference by federal courts. This Article outlines
such an approach.
12 134 U.S. 1 (1890). Hans held that the Amendment, despite its literal terms,
barred a suit by a citizen against her own state in federal court.
13 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Young held that individuals could sue state officials in
federal court for injunctive relief, if those officials were engaged in conduct (even
under color of state law) which disparaged federally generated rights. See also
Monaghan, supra note 10, at 126-28.
[VOL- 72:4
ADMIRALTY AND THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
I. THE FRAMERS' UNDERSTANDING
A. Sovereign Immunity of the Crown and Colonies
As already noted, it is well established that the Eleventh Amend-
ment was proposed as a direct response to the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Chisholm v. Georgia,14 which held that states could be sued in
assumpsit in federal courts by a private citizen of another state. What
has been rarely considered, at least in the context of admiralty juris-
diction, was the preexisting law of sovereign immunity and the per-
ceptions of the Adopters in considering whether states of a federal
union should be immune from in rem admiralty proceedings.
The received wisdom, of course, is that the principle of sovereign
immunity-quite literally, the "King can do no wrong"' 5-was trans-
mitted directly from England to its North American colonies. 16 The
reality is rather more complex. For starters, it is by no means clear
that English common law was absolute in protecting the Crown from
suit. While it was a principle that the King could not be sued in his
own courts-and the High Court of Admiralty in London was one of
those prerogative tribunals-this was largely modified by the Petition
of Right'7 and monstrans de droit,'8 both forms of action which allowed
proceedings against the Crown. And in the High Court of Admiralty,
only a limited form of immunity was extended to the Crown.' 9 In
14 2 U.S. (2 Dallas) 419 (1793).
15 1 Wnuias BLACsroNE, CommENir s *244.
16 The U.S. Supreme Court has suggested on occasion that sovereign immunity
may have derived not necessarily from the English common law, but from the "juris-
prudence of all civilized nations." See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 17 (1890) (quot-
ing Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1857)); see also Seminole, 116 S. Ct.
at 1130. But see id. at 1145-49, 1160 & n.26, 1176 n.59 (Souter, J., dissenting) (savag-
ing this view).
17 See CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNnIY 5-6
(1972); Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U.
CHI. L. REv. 61, 88 (1989). For more on the contemporaneous understanding of the
Framers as to the British Crown's immunity from suit, see Chisolm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at
437-45 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
18 See 9 Sm WniL AM HOLDSWORTH, A HisTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 24-26 (3d ed.
1926) (monstrans de droit meant literally a manifestation of right, allowing a subject to
sue the Crown for possession of property claimed by the Crown); see also 3 BLAcK-
STONE, supra note 15, at *256-57.
19 See, e.g., The Marquis of Hunfly, 3 Hag. Adm. 246, 166 Eng. Rep. 397 (Adm.
1835) (Nicholl, J.) (allowing an in rem salvage award to be assessed against govern-
ment owned cargo); The Lord Hobart, 2 Dods. 100, 165 Eng. Rep. 1428 (Adm. 1815)
(concluding that a post office packet may be arrested in a suit for mariner's wages);
TheJane, 1 Dods. 461, 165 Eng. Rep. 1378 (Adm. 1814) (holding that hypothecation
or mortgage of a hired transport vessel in the service of the government is enforcea-
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certain kinds of admiralty proceedings, most notably those in prize (in
which the Admiralty Court determined whether a capture of an en-
emy vessel or cargo was proper under international law as applied in
England), the Crown was not immune from suit.20
Professor Massey has persuasively shown, in any event, that in the
colonies "there was no universal belief that the sovereign was immune
from suit."2 1 The Charters of many colonies contained clauses dis-
claiming sovereign immunity,22 and upon independence from Eng-
land in 1776, not a single one of the new states included in its
constitution a general grant of sovereign immunity.2 3 Lastly, Ameri-
can legal commentators at the time of Independence were sharply
critical of the idea of sovereign immunity, and saw it as a legal vestige
of a remote and hostile King with whom they were waging war.2 4
ble in rem); see also The Prins Frederik, 2 Dods. 451,464, 483-86, 165 Eng. Rep. 1543,
1548, 1554-55 (Adm. 1820) (Scott, J.) (allowing in rem salvage action against foreign
warship, and impliedly disavowing contrary, unreported 1816 precedent in The Comus
from the same court). But see The Athol, 1 W. Rob. 374, 382, 166 Eng. Rep. 613, 616
(Adm. 1842) (Lushington, J.) (suggesting that the Lords of the Admiralty must con-
sent to appear in an action brought against a Crown vessel).
20 See The Zamora, [1916] 2 App. Cas. 77, 91 (P.C.) (Parker, L.) (After assessing
the earlier precedents of the Admiralty Court, the Privy Council concluded that "all
those matters upon which the [Prize] Court is authorized to proceed are, or arise out
of, acts done by the sovereign power in right of war. It follows that the King must,
directly or indirectly, be a party to all proceedings in a Court of Prize. In such a
[c]ourt his position is in fact the same as in the ordinary courts of the realm upon a
petition of right which has been duly fiated. Rights based on sovereignty are waived
and the Crown for most purposes accepts the position of an ordinary litigant.").
For more on prize jurisprudence, see my earlier review essay, DavidJ. Bederman,
The Feigned Demise of Prize, 9 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 31 (1995) (reviewing 11 J.H.W.
VERZIJL ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: THE LAW OF MARITIME
PRIZE (1992)).
21 Massey, supra note 17, at 89; see also Doyle Mathis, The Eleventh Amendment:
Adoption and Interpretation, 2 GA. L. REv. 207, 209 (1968).
22 See Massey, supra note 17, at 89 (citing the Colonial Charters of Massachusetts
(1620 & 1629), Connecticut (1662), and Rhode Island (1663)).
23 SeeJohnJ. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Rein-
terpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1897-98 (1983). Two states-Connecticut and
Rhode Island-readopted the contrary provisions of their Colonial Charters, thus ex-
pressly allowing suits against the state. See id. at 1898 n.42. Both Delaware and Penn-
sylvania adopted constitutional provisions that permitted the state to waive sovereign
immunity. See SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 205-06
(1975) (Delaware provision noted that "[s]uits may be brought against the state, ac-
cording to such regulations as shall be made law."); id. at 286, 293 (Pennsylvania
Constitution allowed that "[s]uits may be brought against the Commonwealth in such
manner, in such courts, and in such cases as the legislature may by law direct.").
24 SeeJACOBS, supra note 17, at 6-8; Massey, supra note 17, at 89-91.
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B. Admiralty Jurisdiction
It may be surprising to realize that the admiralty courts and their
jurisdiction were viewed with the same hostility by the colonists. After
all, the Vice Admiralty Courts (one for each colony, later consolidated
into four courts) were staffed by'judges appointed directly by the
Crown and were charged with wide-ranging revenue collection and
enforcement powers. 25 Indeed, the powers and jurisdiction of the
Vice Admiralty Courts were more far-reaching than those the High
Court of Admiralty in London. The perceived abuses of the Vice Ad-
miralty Courts were even noted in the Declaration of American Inde-
pendence in 1776.26
During the Articles of Confederation period, each new state er-
ected its own admiralty tribunal to replace the royal Vice Admiralty
courts. In response to the tyrannical reputation of those benches,
states (for a short time) even experimented with the use of juries in
admiralty and prize proceedings.27 Evidence seems to suggest that the
work of these state admiralty courts was limited to condemnations in
prize, violations of state revenue laws, and some occasional suits
brought by mariners for their unpaid wages.28 This last kind of suit
25 See DAVID R. OWEN & MICAEL C. TOLLEY, COURTS OF ADMIRALTY IN COLONIAL
AMERICA: THE MARYLAND EXPERIENCE, 1634-1776 (1995); CARL UBBELOHDE, THE VICE
ADMIRALTy COURTS AN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1960); Charles S. Andrews, Vice-
Admiralty Courts in the Colns, in RECORDS OF THE VICE-ADMiRALTY COURT OF RHODE
ISLAND 1716-1752, at 1-79 (Dorothy S. Towle ed., 1936); David S. Lovejoy, Rights Im-
ply Equality: The Case Against Admiralty Jurisdiction in America, 1764-1776, 16 WM &
MAR Q. (3d ser;) 459 (1959); L. Kinvin Wroth, The Massachusetts 1w/e Admiralty Court
and the Federal Admiralty Jurisdiction, 6 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 250, 367 (1962).
26 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 10, 11, & 12 (U.S. 1776) (King
George III was "obsfruct[ing] the Administration of Justice, by refusing his assent to
Laws for establishing Judiciary Powers," by "mak~ing] Judges dependent on his Will
alone, for the terms of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries,"
and by "erect[ing] a multitude of New Offices, and had sent hither swarms of Officers
to harass our People. .. ").
27 See HENRY BO~fRGUIGNON, THE FIRST FEDERAL COURT: THE FEDERAL APPELLATE
PRIZE COURT OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1775-1787, at 57-75 (1977); see also Ju-
LIUS GOEBEL, THm OLIVER WENDELL HoLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 147-82 (1971).
As a civil law tribunal in England, suits and libels in admiralty were not heard
with ajury. In any event, the states' experiences with juries in admiralty courts were
short-lived. See generally BOURGUIGNON, supra, at 192-94.
28 For an analysis of the kinds of suits brought in state admiralty courts between
1775 and 1787, see William R. Casto, The Origins of Federal Admiralty Jurisdiction in an
Age of Privateers, Smugglers, and Pirates, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HisT. 117, 126-29 (1993) (re-
viewing published compilations of decisions in FRANCIS HOPKINSONJUDGMENTS IN THE
ADnMRALTY COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA, 1779-1788 (Philadelphia, T. Dobson 1792);
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was often initiated in rem by arresting the vessel on which the mariner
had worked and thus had a lien.2 9 In one tantalizingly elliptical deci-
sion of the Pennsylvania Court of Admiralty in 1781, it was held that
"mariners enlisting on board a ship of war, or vessel belonging to a
sovereign independent state, cannot libel against a ship for wages
due."30 The libelled vessel was the South Carolina, a duly commis-
sioned warship of the "sovereign independent state" of the same
name.
Despite the perception among the rebelling colonists that the
Crown's admiralty tribunals-and the substantive law they applied-
were to be regarded as alien and despotic, the Articles of Confedera-
tion actually did confer an admiralty jurisdiction upon the fledgling
United States government. Article IX, section I of the Articles granted
that jurisdiction over "the trial of piracies and felonies committed on
the high seas; and.., appeals in all cases of capture."3' Pursuant to
this provision, the Continental Congress established the first national
tribunal which heard appeals from state courts concerning disputed
captures of enemy vessels and cargoes during the Revolutionary
War.32 We shall soon hear more about this court and its rulings in a
number of controversial cases.
CHARLES MERRILL HOUGH, REPORTS OF CASES IN THE VICE ADMIRALTY OF THE PROVINCE
OF NEW YORK AND IN THE COURT OF ADMIRALTY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, 1715-1788
(1925); A. ToKAY, MARITIME COURTS AND ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION IN CONNECTICUT,
1776-1789 (1975); Aldrich, Admiralty Jurisdiction and the Admiralty Courts of New Hamp-
shire During the Colonial and Revolutionary Period, 10 PROC. B. ASS'N N.H. 31, 47-54
(1909)).
29 See The Talbot v. Commander and Owners of the Three Brigs, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.)
95, 100 (Pa. 1784) ("[Tlhe case of wages [is] justly a favorite object of Admiralty
Jurisdiction.").
30 Moitez v. The South Carolina, 17 F. Cas. 574, 574 (Pa. Adm. Ct. 1781) (No.
9697) (Hopkinson, J.). The judge in the case, Francis Hopkinson, later became one
of the first federal district judges under the Constitution. See BOURGUIGNON, supra
note 27, at 331. The decision in Moitez was interpreted by another judge to extend as
a prohibition against in rem arrests against vessels in actual public service, and not to
free-lance privateers. See Ellison v. The Bellona, 8 F. Cas. 559, 559 (D.S.C. 1798) (No.
4407) (Bee, J.).
31 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. 9, § 1, reprinted in 1 Stat. 4, 6 (1777).
32 For more on which, see BOURGUIGNON, supra note 27. As for its power to cre-
ate a court for the trial of maritime crimes, Congress delegated this function to the
states. See WFRED J. Rrrz, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789, at
99-101 (Wythe Holt & L. H. LaRue eds. 1990). In the Constitution of 1787, the fed-
eral Congress was granted the power to "define and punish piracy and Felonies com-
mitted on the High Seas, and offenses against the law of nations." U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 10.
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By 1787, of course, the defects of the Articles of Confederation
had become manifest to the leading politicians of the day gathered in
Philadelphia. Although certainly not a primary concern, a number of
the lawyers who had been active in the Contintental Congress had
been dissatisfied with the weak federal judiciary created by the Arti-
cles, and were particularly concerned over the disharmony and lack of
uniformity of state court decisions handed down in admiralty and
maritime law cases. 33 In response, the Constitution provided simply
that "the judicial Power [of the United States] shall extend to ... all
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction."34
What the Framers originally intended by the allocation of admi-
ralty jurisdiction to the federal courts has remained a mystery. Virtu-
ally no discussion was recorded on the subject at the Constitutional
Convention.3 5 In the subsequent ratification debates, Alexander
Hamilton, writing in The Federalist, did say that the allocation of admi-
ralty jurisdiction to the federal courts was intended to promote uni-
formity. Hamilton wrote:
The most bigoted idolizers of state authority have not thus far
shewn a disposition to deny the national judiciary the cognizance of
maritime causes. These so generally depend on the laws of nations,
and so commonly affect the rights of foreigners, that they fall within
the considerations which are relative to the public peace.36
Some recent writers have speculated that Alexander Hamilton's
views should be credited for what they were: the purpose of the vest-
ing of admiralty jurisdiction in the federal courts was really intended
to protect the young United States from the diplomatic consequences
flowing from certain kinds of admiralty controversies, most notably
questions having to do with the capture of enemy or neutral vessels in
time of war (what was called "prize" jurisdiction) .37 The concern for
33 See Casto, supra note 28, at 129-32; Wythe Holt, "To Establish Justice": Politics, the
Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DuKE L.J. 1421,
1427-30. The states had attempted also to interfere with appeals taken from state
admiralty courts to the Confederation's Court of Appeals for Capture. See
BOUlRGUIGNON, supra note 27, at 101-34, 297-318.
34 U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 2. For more on the drafting of this Clause by the Con-
vention's Committee of Detail, see Casto, supra note 28, at 132-35.
35 See Austin Tappan Wright, Uniformity in the Maritime Law of the United States, 73
U. PA. L. REv. 123, 128-29 (1925).
36 THE FEDERAL=T No. 80, at 478 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961); see also 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIEs ON THE CONSTrrTION OF THE UNrrED
STATES 503-06 (3d ed., Boston, Little Brown & Co. 1858).
37 See Casto, supra note 28, at 135-37.
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uniformity did not seem, at least in the Framers' contemplation, to
extend to the commercial aspects of the maritime law.38
When the First Congress convened under the authority of the
Constitution, it charged President Washington's Attorney General,
Edmund Randolph, to prepare a study of the just created federal judi-
ciary.39 His conclusions on admiralty jurisdiction were issued in 1790
and, as has been noted by Professor Casto,40 were quite significant. It
is important to bear in mind that Randolph had heard appeals in
prize cases brought to the Continental Congress prior to the adoption
of the Articles of Confederation. 41 He was the acknowledged leader
of the Virginia delegation at the Constitutional Convention, and was a
member of the Committee of Detail which had actually drafted the
Admiralty Clause in the Judiciary Article of the Constitution. 42
In his report, Randolph proceeded from the premise that "[t] he
nature [of admiralty litigation] shuts out the jurisdiction of the State
courts, as such, on the vital principles of the Union."43 Randolph was
emphatic that the states "by joining the federal compact... ha[ve]
resigned [their admiralty jurisdiction] to the Federal Government."44
He specifically included the following subject matters within the par-
ticular competence of the federal admiralty jurisdiction: "1. condemn-
ing all lawful prizes in time of war, 2. criminal sea law, 3. offenses on
water against the revenue laws, and 4. claims for specific satisfaction
on the body of a vessel, as for mariners' wages, &c." 45
Professor Casto has forcefully argued that Randolph's conception
of a federal admiralty jurisdiction was essentially that of Alexander
Hamilton's: strictly limited to those subject matters which directly im-
plicated the concerns of the federal government over the conduct of
38 But see id. at 138-39 (discussing comments made by James Madison and Ed-
mund Randolph at the Ratification Debates that are at least suggestive of a concern
regarding uniformity of decisions in private maritime commerce cases); see also South-
ern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 251 (1917) (Pitney, J., dissenting).
39 H.R. REP. 1st Cong., 3d Sess. (Dec. 31, 1790), reprinted in 1 AMERiCAN STATE
PAPERS: CLASS X MIscELLANEous 21-22 (Walter Lowrie & Walter S. Franklin eds.,
1834) [hereinafter Randolph Report]; see also Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A
Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1245, 1333 (1996).
40 See Casto, supra note 28, at 119-22.
41 See C. Hobson, The Early Career of Edmund Randolph, 1753-1789, at 75-76
(1971) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Emory University).
42 See 2 MAx FARRAND, THE REcoRD OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 97
(rev. ed. 1937).
43 Randolph Report, supra note 39, at 22.
44 Id. at 25; see also Letter from Edmund Randolph to Thomas Jefferson (Nov. 13,
1779), in 3 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 184 (J. Boyd ed. 1951).
45 Randolph Report, supra note 39, at 25.
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war and diplomacy.46 Private maritime disputes, Casto has suggested,
did not figure prominently in Randolph's plan for the federal admi-
ralty court, despite his mention of "claims for specific satisfaction on
the body of a vessel," which we would today call a maritime lien en-
forced by an in rem action against a vessel or other property. Ran-
dolph noted that for such claims, "the State Legislatures may establish
ajurisdiction reaching the vessel itself."47 Confirming evidence of the
Framer's intent for the non-exclusiveness of federal admiralty jurisdic-
tion can probably be gleaned from section nine of the Judiciary Act of
1789, by which the basic federal court structure and jurisdiction was
established. That section provided that the district courts of the
United States shall have "exclusive original cognizance of all civil
causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction...; saving to suitors, in
all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is
competent to give it."48
What Randolph seemed to be suggesting was that, based on the
"savings to suitors" clause of the Judiciary Act of 1789, state courts
might be able to offer a common law remedy which allowed in rem
process "reaching the vessel itself." But in this he was mistaken.
American courts had consistently ruled that an in rem libel enforcing
a maritime lien that had attached to a vessel was a uniquely admiralty
remedy, and thus was not saved to suitors.49 As a consequence, the
sole forum for bringing an in rem action was in the federal admiralty
46 See Casto, supra note 28, at 120-21.
47 Randolph Report, supra note 39, at 22.
48 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1)
(1994)) (known as Judiciary Act of 1789). For a contrary view of the meaning of this
provision, see Steven Breker-Cooper, The Eleventh Amendment: A Textual Solution, 38
WAYNE L. REv. 1481, 1519-20 (1992).
49 See The Hind v. Trevor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 555, 571-72 (1866); The Moses Tay-
lor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 431 (1866). Professor Casto has suggested that the U.S.
Supreme Court's enunciation in The Moses Taylor and The Hind that an in rem remedy
is within the exclusive jurisdiction of federal admiralty courts was "virtually unprece-
dented in 1866 when it was essentially invented by the Court." Casto, supra note 28, at
142; accord Clark, supra note 39, at 1350-51.
I must beg to disagree, and the sources upon which Casto relies seem to disagree,
too. While fewjudicial decisions and publicists drew the clear connection between an
in rem remedy and exclusive federal courtjurisdiction, the authorities were clear that
in rem remedies were not available in common law courts. See CHARLES ABBOTT, A
TREATISE OF THE LAW RELATVE TO MERCHANT SHIPS AND SEAMEN 162, 238 n.1, 654, 665
n.2, 788 n.1 (6th Am. ed. 1850);JOSEPH ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CARRIERS
OF GOODS AND PASSENGERS BY LAND AND BY WATER § 610 (1849); 2 ARTHUR BROWNE, A
COMPENDIOUS VIEW OF THE CIvI. LAW AND OF THE LAW OF THE ADMIRALTY 111-12 (2d
ed. 1802). For more on Browne's influence, see Joseph C. Sweeney, The Admiralty Law
of Arthur Browne, 26 J. MA.. L. & CoM. 59 (1995).
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court, and, to this extent, the states "by joining the federal com-
pact . . . ha[d] resigned [this jurisdiction] to the Federal
Government."50
C. State Sovereign Immunity and the Constitution
Attorney General Randolph's language was significant, for it bore
not only on the capacity of state courts to hear admiralty matters, but
also on the immunities enjoyed by states in the new federal courts. As
for sovereign immunity and federal jurisdiction, consider Alexander
Hamilton's comments in The Federalist No. 81:
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable to the
suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense and
the general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the
attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every
state in the union. Unless therefore, there is a surrender of this
immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the
states, and the danger intimated must be merely ideal.... A recur-
rence to the principles there established will satisfy us, that there is
no colour to pretend that the state governments, would by the
adoption of that plan, be divested of the privilege of paying their
own debts in their own way, free from every constraint but that
which flows from the obligations of good faith.5 '
Much ink has been spilt as to Hamilton's meaning here.52 Was
he articulating a conception of full-blown state sovereignty which an-
Moreover, some sources were clear in making the correlation between in rem
remedies and exclusive federal court jurisdiction. See Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5
How.) 441, 461 (1847) (Wayne, J.) ("It [the savings to suitors clause of the Judiciary
Act of 1789] certainly could not have been intended more for the benefit of the
defendant than for the plaintiff, which would be the case if he could at his will force
the plaintiff into a common law court, and in that way release himself and his prop-
erty from all the responsibilities which a court of admiralty can impose upon both, as
a security and indemnity for injuries of which a libellant may complain,-securities
which a court of common law cannot give."); Ashbrook v. The Golden Gate, 2 F. Cas.
10, 10-11, 12 (D. Mo. 1856) (No. 574); Clarke v. NewJersey Steam Navigation Co., 5
F. Cas. 974 (C.C.D. RI. 1841) (No. 2859); Percival v. Hickey, 18Johns. 257, 292 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1820).
50 Randolph Report, supra note 39, at 25.
51 THE FEDERALIST No. 81, supra note 36, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton); see also
THE FEDERALIST No. 32, id., at 200 (Alexander Hamilton) ("[A]s the plan of the Con-
vention aims only at the partial Union or consolidation, the State Governments would
clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had and which were not
by that act exclusively delegated to the United States.").
52 For a sampling, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 370 (2d ed.
1994); JAcoBs, supra note 17, at 40; 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN
UNITED STATES HISTORY 91 (1922); Stewart A. Baker, Federalism and the Eleventh Amend-
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tedated the Constitution?53 If so, would this bar a state from being
haled into a federal court unless it had explicitly consented in the
litigation, waived its immunity by state statute, or implicitly accepted
federal court jurisdiction by acceding to the Constitution under the
"plan of the convention"?
Reading Hamilton's and Randolph's remarks together suggests
strongly that there was a class of cases over which the federal courts
were given exclusive jurisdiction and in which, states would not enjoy
immunity if they were sued as a defendant. Assuming (and it may be
an heroic assumption) that Hamilton was describing a class of cases to
which, under the "plan of the convention," states would not be im-
mune, the problem is to determine the sorts of controversies he was
contemplating.
What few have realized in glossing The Federalist No. 81 is that
Hamilton went on to consider a topic closely allied to state sovereign
immunity: the ability of the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its ap-
pellate jurisdiction, to review the decisions of lower courts. The pre-
cise question he was addressing was whether, in an appeal from a
common law judgment, the Supreme Court could review not only the
legal conclusions reached by the lower court, but also the factual find-
ings made (most likely) by ajury. Hamilton rejected that idea. But as
for judgments from civil law tribunals-of which the leading category
was admiralty-
the re-examination [by the Supreme Court] of the fact[s found by
the court] is agreeable to usage, and in some cases, of which prize
causes are an example, might be essential to the preservation of the
public peace. It is therefore necessary, that the appellate jurisdic-
ment 48 U. CoLO. L. REV. 136 (1977); Gibbons, supra note 23, at 1911-12; Vicki C.
Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98
YALE LJ. 1 (1988); Massey, supra note 17, at 94-96; Monaghan, supra note 10, at
123-24; John E. Nowak, The Scope of the Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action
Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1427-30 (1975).
53 In current Eleventh Amendment litigation, Hamilton's comment is extensively
relied upon for this proposition. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114,
1130 (1996) (citing Hamilton for the proposition). But see id. at 1167-68 (Souter,J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that reliance on Hamilton may be unwarranted).
For a vigorous rebuttal of the notion that Hamilton's statement in The Federalist
No. 81 is clear evidence of the Framers' opinions on state sovereign immunity, "the
crown jewel" of that argument in fact, see Gibbons, supra note 23, at 1911. Judge
Gibbons' view, supported by Professor Massey, supra note 17, at 94-95, is that Hamil-
ton was only making a very modest point: "that no substantive right of action against a
state for its pre-Constitution public debt could exist absent a state's consent to grant
such a right." Gibbons, supra note 23, at 1911.
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don should, in certain cases, extend in the broadest sense to matters
of fact.54
And, as already noted,5 5 it seems to have been beyond question
that certain admiralty remedies-most notably in rem arrests-were
quintessentially civil law in character, and were not saved to suitors in
common law courts.
We will never know, of course, whether the Framers of the Consti-
tution actually intended, under the "plan of the convention," to waive
the entirety of the state's sovereign immunity from suit in the federal
courts. Some delegates may have had that intent, as perhaps Hamil-
ton did.5 6 Quite clearly, some of the Anti-Federalist opponents to the
Constitution railed against this furtive attack on state sovereign immu-
nity.57 And in New York, some members of the ratifying convention in
1788 proposed what they believed to be an equal and opposite riposte
to the thrust of Article III: an amendment providing that "nothing in
the Constitution . . . is to be construed to authorize any suit to be
brought against any state, in any matter whatever."58
D. Admiralty and the States
In the take-no-prisoners debate on the original meaning of Arti-
cle III and its impact on state sovereign immunity, no one has both-
ered to wonder whether the Framers might possibly have intended a
limited withdrawal of state immunity in federal courts, according to
the "plan of the convention." I am suggesting there is evidence that
the Framers believed and intended the states to be amenable to the
jurisdiction of federal courts in admiralty actions, and particularly
those actuated by in rem libels.
I begin with the premise that the Framers contemplated a core
area of exclusive federal courtjurisdiction over admiralty matters. It is
not necessary to my argument to believe that Article III literally meant
54 THE FEDERALIST No. 81, supra note 36, at 488-89 (Alexander Hamilton).
55 See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
56 Hamilton was said to have supported the Supreme Court's decision in, Chisolm
v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), which interpreted Article III to permit a state to
be sued by an individual from another state or country for a contract or debt. See 17
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 9, 12 & n.13 (1972) (minutes of conference of Aug.
2, 1974) (quoting Hamilton as saying that opposition to the Court's decision in
Chisolm was "opposition to the Constitution").
57 See Gibbons, supra note 23, at 1906 (Virginia debates); Nowak, supra note 52, at
1425-27 (discussing ratification debates in New York and Virginia).
58 2 JONATHAN ELLIOTT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTTrrUTION 409 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott 1876)
(emphasis added).
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what it said: that "all cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction"
were to be in federal court. That would make a nonsense out of the
"savings to suitors" clause of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which clearly
allowed concurrent state court jurisdiction over a class of cases in
which a common law remedy was being sought. Rather, I think the
Framers intended that those admiralty cases actuated through in rem
arrests and libels (and not through common law in personam pro-
cess) would be handled exclusively by the new federal courts. As Ed-
mundRandolph noted in his 1790 report, the states when joining the
Union "resigned [this power] to the Federal Government."59
I believe also that the Framers drew a parallel between the states'
surrender ofjudicial power to the federal government (as reflected in
the Admiralty Clause in Article III) and their relinquishment of sover-
eign immunity in federal court. Each was part of the same bargain in
the "plan of the convention," as both Hamilton and Randolph wrote.
It would have made no sense for the Framers to have believed that
certain kinds of admiralty cases were triable only in federal court, and
then to have allowed those same suits to proceed in state court if one
of the claimants to the disputed res, or property, was a state govern-
ment. So even if the states enjoyed sovereign immunity from suit in
admiralty cases during the Articles of Confederation period, and that
might have been suggested in the cryptic holding of the Moitez case,60
they lost it with the ratification of the Constitution. The Anti-Federal-
ist opponents to the Constitution (correctly) recognized that state sov-
ereign immunity had been bargained away at Philadelphia.
Quite clearly, the Framers were most concerned about state admi-
ralty courts adjudicating prizes. And they hid good reason to be.
Prize actions involved the legality of maritime captures in wartime
under the law of nations and implicated the most delicate questions of
diplomacy and national security. Hamilton said, these were questions
"essential to the preservation of the public peace." 61 And as I have
narrated, 62 during the Confederation period there had been a con-
stant struggle between state courts and the Congress (acting through
its Court of Appeals for Captures) over which would have the last say
in many of the disputed-and financially lucrative-claims to vessels
and cargoes captured from the British Crown and its subjects during
the late war. It is inconceivable to me that the Framers of the Consti-
tution intended that prize cases in which a state government had a
59 Randolph Report, supra note 39, at 25.
60 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
61 THE FEDERALIST No. 81, supra note 36, at 488-89 (Alexander Hamilton).
62 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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substantial interest (as a captor or other claimant) would be adjudi-
cated in state court because of state sovereign immunity.
I think the Framers had the same concerns over non-prize ("in-
stance") cases within the admiralty jurisdiction. But once again the
key issue was whether state courts would have concurrentjurisdiction.
If they did, state sovereign immunity in federal court was not so objec-
tionable. For in rem proceedings, however, which were denied to
state courts under the Framers' understanding of the "savings to suit-
ors" clause, a state's claim to sovereign immunity could not be seri-
ously entertained in a federal court proceeding in which the state was
a claimant to disputed property. Alexander Hamilton was right to
note that civil law proceedings in rem were of a different kind and
character, one which, "agreeable to usage," 63 would permit the adjudi-
cation of a state's interests in a disputed property in a federal admi-
ralty court.
II. THE ADOPTERS' UNDERSTANDING
One could charge that these are idle speculations, rendered irrel-
evant by the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment itself. But there is
that small matter of textual silence in the Amendment. It doesn't
mention admiralty cases, while it does explicitly cover "any suit in law
or equity." A textual gap in a constitutional text requires contextual
filling, and for that we must turn to the available evidence of the adop-
tion of the Amendment in response to the Supreme Court's decision
in Chisolm v. Georgia.
A. Chisolm and its Critics
In 1792, the executor of a South Carolina merchant brought an
action in assumpsit against the State of Georgia in the U.S. Supreme
Court, claiming breach of a supplies contract from the Revolutionary
War.64 Georgia, claiming sovereign immunity, declined to even enter
an appearance in the Supreme Court.65 Chisolm's argument before
the Court was presented by none other than Edmund Randolph, the
sitting Attorney General of the United States, 66 and his argument pro-
63 See supra note 54.
64 For historical background on the case, see Gibbons, supra note 23, at 1921-23;
Massey, supra note 17, at 98-100; Mathis, supra note 21, at 217-19.
65 SeeJACOBS, supra note 17, at 48.
66 See Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 419 (1793). Judge Gibbons per-
suasively argues that Randolph's representation had been approved by the Washing-
ton administration, anxious to allow the Supreme Court to enforce the United States'
obligations under the Peace Treaty with Great Britain, a position that Georgia was
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ceeded from the clear language of Article III's grant ofjudicial power
to the federal courts (as confirmed in the Judiciary Act of 1789),67
which appeared unconditioned by whether the state was a plaintiff or
a defendant. All but one justice of the Court (Iredell dissented) 68 ac-
cepted this argument, leaving open the substantive merits of
Chisolm's case, as these might have been affected by any immunities
Georgia might enjoy under its own common law or statutory grants
against collection of its sovereign debts and obligations. 69
Randolph's argument was a ringing plea for federal supremacy
and uniformity. Because the Constitution imposed a number of re-
strictions upon the states-among these Randolph enumerated7" the
prohibition against issuing authorizations to privateers to make cap-
tures on the high seas ("grant[ing] Letters of Marque and Reprisal") 7'
and that against laying imposts or duties on tonnage, imports, or ex-
ports, 72 both concerns of maritime law-it was surely contemplated
that redress could be had against states in federal court.
"[U] nconstitutional actions must pass without muster," Randolph ar-
gued, "unless States can be made defendants . . . . These
evils.., cannot be corrected without a suit against the state" by ag-
defying by refusing to recognize the Supreme Court's jurisdiction in cases brought by
foreign citizens against a state. See Gibbons, supra note 23, at 1923.
67 SeeJudiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 80.
The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies of a
civil nature, where a state is a party, except between a state and its own cii-
zens; and except also between a state and citizens of other states, or aliens, in
which latter case it shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction.
Id.
68 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1134-36 (1996) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (analyzing Justice Iredell's dissent in Chisolm); see alsoJohn V. Orth, The
Truth AboutJustice Iredell's Dissent in Chisolm v. Georgia (1793), 73 N.C. L. REV. 255
(1994).
69 See Chisolm, 2 U.S. (2 Dal.) at 479 (Jay, CJ.); see also Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at
1140-41 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (analyzing Chisolm); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty
and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1469-70 (1987); William A. Fletcher, A Historical
Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of
Jurisdiction Rather than Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1055-56
(1983); Gibbons, supra note 23, at 1925-26; Nowak, supra note 52, at 1430-33.
70 See Chisolm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 421-22 (Randolph, argument).
71 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. Moreover, the Constitution also barred states
from keeping "Ships of War in time of Peace." Id. at cl. 3. This would have removed
another source of sovereign friction and another reason that a state would have to
enjoy sovereign immunity in admiralty actions filed in a federal court. Such a claim of
state sovereign immunity was made by South Carolina in the Moitez case. See supra
note 30 and accompanying text.
72 U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 10, cls. 2 & 3; see also THE FDERA.IsT No. 32, supra note 36,
at 202 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing this restriction on state sovereignty).
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grieved citizens. 73 Finally, echoing his (and Hamilton's) earlier com-
ments on state sovereign immunity and the "plan of the convention,"
Randolph argued in Chisolm that the states had entered the Union of
their "free will" and were thus "liable to process."74
Much has been made of the fact that Chisolm did not concern the
federal courts' admiraltyjurisdiction. Later courts and commentators
could fairly conclude, therefore, that to the extent the Eleventh
Amendment responded to the Supreme Court's holding in Chisolm, it
is unsurprising and unexceptional that the text of the Amendment
would be silent as to admiralty matters. 75 This deduction ignores not
only the salient conditions which influenced the Adopter's thinking
about admiralty and state sovereign immunity, it also ignores some
hints made in the body of the Chisolm decision.
In Randolph's argument to the Court, he expressly noted that
had a suit been commenced against property in rem in federal court,
and a claim to that res was subsequently interposed by a state, no im-
munity would be granted to the state.76 Even more emphatically,
Chief Justice John Jay added to Randolph's list of powers that the
states had ceded to the federal government as part of the "plan of the
convention." He included the grant of admiralty jurisdiction in Arti-
cle III, "because, as the seas are the joint property of nations, whose
73 Chisolm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 423 (Randolph, argument).
74 Id.
75 See In re New York (Petition of Walsh), 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921) ("It is true
[that] the [Eleventh] Amendment speaks only of suits in law or equity; but this is
because, as was pointed out in Hans v. Louisiana, the Amendment was the outcome of
a purpose to set aside the effect of the decision of this court in Chisolm which hap-
pened to be a suit at law brought against the State by a citizen of another State ....")
(citations omitted); see also Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1130 (1996)
(making the same suggestion but with regard to the fact that Chisolm did not contem-
plate federal question jurisdiction).
76 See Chisolm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 425--26 (Randolph, argument) ("The jurisdiction
of this Court reaches to Georgia, as well as to Philadelphia. If therefore, the process
could be commenced in ren, the authority of Bynkershoek would justify [the Court to
hold it has jurisdiction over Georgia]; and whether it be commenced in ren, or in
personam, the principle of amenability [of the state to suit] is equally avowed.").
Randolph's citation to the work of Cornelius van Bynkershoek is somewhat mys-
terious. See id. at 425 n.* (citing "8 Bynk. c.3 c.4"). The best guess is that he was
referring to CORNELIUS VAN BYNKERSHOEK, DE FoRo LEGATORUM LIBER SINcULARS [A
MONOGRAPH ON THE JURISDICTION OVER AMBASSADORS IN BOTH CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
CASES] (1744), reprinted in CLASSIcS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 22-25 (Gordon J. Laing
transl., Clarendon Press 1946) (photo. reprint 1995) (noting that "[t]hrough the
practice of nations it has been established that [foreign sovereign] property.., shall
be treated just like the property of private individuals and shall be subject in equal
degree to burdens and taxes").
[VOL- 72:4
ADMIRALTY AND THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
right[s] and privileges relative thereto, are regulated by the law of na-
tions and treaties, such cases necessarily belong to national jurisdic-
tion."77 Here again is the connection between the powers of the
federal government and the sovereign immunity enjoyed by the states
in the new federal courts: federal judicial power necessarily included
admiralty jurisdiction, and this necessity required from the beginning
a corresponding exception to state sovereign immunity. The justices
who decided Chisolm were well aware of the admiralty jurisdiction and
its impact on claims of state sovereign immunity. This was surely man-
ifest and notorious to any state official or member of Congress who
read the decision and resolved to achieve by Amendment what the
Constitution-and the Supreme Court-had failed to embrace: a
sweeping recognition of state sovereign immunity from suit in the fed-
eral courts.
B. Congress Debates the Eleventh Amendment
Very little is known about the passage of the Eleventh Amend-
ment in Congress in 1793 and 1794. As best as can be discerned,
within a day or two of the handing down of the decision in Chisoim, a
constitutional amendment was introduced in the House of Represent-
atives by Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts. It provided that:
[N] o state shall be liable to be made a party defendant in any of the
judicial courts, established, or which shall be established under the
authority of the United States, at the suit of any person or persons
whether a citizen or citizens, or a foreigner or foreigners, of any
body politic or corporate, whether within or without the United
States.78
Sedgwick's rather prolix proposal was clearly offered in anticipa-
tion of the entreaties that would be made by various state governors
and legislatures for the adoption of a constitutional amendment in
the wake of the Chisolm.79 Both Massachusetts and Virginia adopted
resolutions80 calling on an amendment that would clarify that a State,
"should [not] be held liable to answer on compulsory civil process,"81
nor "be made a defendant at the suit of any individual or individu-
77 Chisolm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 475 (Jay, CJ.).
78 PA.J. & WaLY. ADVERTiSER, Feb. 27, 1793, at col. 2, quoted in Fletcher, supra note
69, at 1058-59 & n.116. This proposal was never reprinted in the Annals of Congress,
the official gazette of record for Congress. See also Mathis, supra note 21, at 226 &
n.73 (providing a slightly different citation).
79 See Gibbons, supra note 23, at 1931.
80 See Mathis, supra note 21, at 224-26.
81 RESOLVES OF THE GENERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF YASSACHUSETTS
28, 31-32 (1793).
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als. ''82 These were much like the resolution adopted by the New York
Assembly in 1788.83 Some states even made calls for a Convention to
be summoned under Article V of the Constitution to remedy the
Chisolm decision.84 The thrust of all of these proposals was clearly to
reverse Chisolm, as well as to go a step further and insulate states from
any in personam process at the instance of an individual in a federal
court. Left unstated, of course, was any concern about the ability of
federal courts to hear in rem actions in which the state was a claimant
to disputed property.
In any event, Representative Sedgwick's proposed amendment
was tabled in the House; while in the Senate this text was proposed on
February 20, 1793, by an unknown member: "The Judicial Power of
the United States shall not extend to any suits in law or equity, com-
menced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of
another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign State." 5 This
text, nearly identical to the one adopted the following year, certainly
had the virtue of tighter composition, but carried with it the same
problem of textual silence: the amendment seemed only a partial ri-
poste to Chisolm and, unlike Representative Sedgwick's proposal, did
not extend broad sovereign immunities to the states.8 6 Moreover, ac-
tions in law and equity were mentioned, but those characteristic of the
admiralty jurisdiction were not. Curiously, and for some scholars
quite significantly,8 7 no legislative action was taken by Congress on
these proposed amendments in 1793.
On January 2, 1794, likely the same unidentifed Senator re-intro-
duced his draft amendment.88 The proposal was taken from the table
on January 13 and debated on January 14,89 when two additional
drafts were submitted. Senator Albert Gallatin of Pennsylvania, a Re-
publican ally of Madison and Jefferson, proposed the following:
The Judicial power of the United States, except in cases arising
under treaties made under the authority of the United States, shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced
82 1793 Va. Acts ch. 52; 1 Statutes at Large of Virginia, 1792-1806, at 284 (1835).
83 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
84 See Gibbons, supra note 23, at 1930-32; Massey, supra note 17, at 113; see also
U.S. CONST. art. V.
85 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 651-52 (1793). For more on the disputed authorship of
this proposal, see Gibbons, supra note 23, at 1926-27.
86 See Gibbons, supra note 23, at 1927.
87 See id. at 1926-32.
88 4 ANNALs OF CONG. 25 (1794).
89 Id. at 29-30.
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or prosecuted against one of the United States, by citizens of an-
other State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign State.90
An unidentified senator proposed this version:
The Judicial power of the United States extends to all cases in law
and equity in which one of the United States is a party; but no suit
shall be prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of
another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign State, where the
cause of action shall have arisen before the ratification of this
amendment.91
Neither of these versions was accepted. Although no explanation
is provided in the Annals of Congress, the historical context explains
their respective rejections. Gallatin's surprising proposal would have,
under the Peace Treaty of 1783, enabled loyal British subjects to sue
states to recover property expropriated by the rebelling colonies or
allowed citizens of other foreign nations to sue in recovery of de-
faulted state bonds. 92 This would have wreaked havoc on the foreign
relations of a young America at a time when the world's contemporary
superpowers, England and France, were on the verge of war. The
United States wished to stay neutral to protect its ships at sea from the
warships and privateers of both nations. Although Jefferson's Repub-
lican party was aligned with anti-Federalist sentiments in many states,
Gallatin's motion had the sanction of Jefferson. 9 3
The second proposal was an apparently misguided attempt to of-
fer a compromise solution in the wake of Chisolm.9 4 It would have
confirmed the jurisdictional result in that case by allowing prospective
suits against state defendants in the Supreme Court. At the same
time, however, it would bar suits arising previously, including the vexa-
tious suits for Revolutionary debts and recovery of Loyalist property
confiscated by state governments. It had no chance of passage.
So it was that the first proposal made in the Senate was approved
by a vote of 23 to 2. 95 Much has been made of its preambular state-
ment that the "Judicial Power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to" the enumerated kinds of suits, seemingly indicating that
90 Id. at 30.
91 Id.
92 A specific right to sue was granted to aliens for torts in violation of the "law of
nations" or "treaties of the United States" under another provision of the Judiciary
Act of 1789, now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (Supp. 1996).
93 See Gibbons, supra note 23, at 1933. For the views of the Federalist party, see
JACOBS, supra note 17, at 72; Massey, supra note 17, at 114; Nowak, supra note 52, at
1437-40.
94 See Gibbons, supra note 23, at 1933.
95 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 30-31 (1794).
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Congress wished to propose merely a technical reinterpretation of Ar-
ticle 111.96 It was sent to the House of Representatives on January 15
and debated on March 4.97 On that day, language was proposed by
Representative Elias Boudinot of NewJersey,98 a Federalist, that would
have added a clause to the end of the existing draft:
The Judicial Power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suits in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by
citizens or subjects of any foreign State, where such State shall have
previously made provision in their own Courts, whereby such suit may be
prosecuted to effect.99
This version of the amendment would have conditioned state sov-
ereign immunity in federal courts upon the availability of real and
effective remedies in state courts.100 This initiative was soundly de-
feated, 8 to 77, and the original text, as sent to the House by the Sen-
ate, was approved 81 to 9 and thence referred to the several state
legislatures for ratification. 10'
From the surprising number of variants of the Eleventh Amend-
ment that were considered by Congress in 1793 or 1794, some conclu-
sions can be reached about the Adopters' intentions as to admiralty
jurisdiction and state sovereign immunity. First, and most pertinently,
there was no explicit discussion, nor any proposal made, to include
admiralty cases within the ambit of a state's sovereign immunity from
suit in federal court. As has already been noted, the Founding gener-
ation was well aware of distinctions to be made between law, equity,
and admiralty, and yet in none of the Congressional debates was this
distinction drawn. 10 2
Nor was this an oversight, because Albert Gallatin's proposal in
the Senate clearly referred to another basis of federal court jurisdic-
tion over cases arising under "treaties made under the authority of the
United States." That proposal's defeat would have been a clarion call
to action for those who espoused the broadest grant of state sovereign
immunity in order to extend even further the classes of cases to which
96 CompareJAcOBS, supra note 17, at 67-69, and Fletcher, supra note 69, at 1061-62
(suggesting this), with Massey, supra note 17, at 117-18 (criticizing this view).
97 See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 225, 476 (1794).
98 See Mathis, supra note 21, at 227.
99 4 ANNALS OF CoNG. 476 (1794) (emphasis added).
100 See Fletcher, supra note 69, at 1059.
101 See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 477, 1484 (1794).
102 See Fletcher, supra note 69, at 1061.
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the Amendment applied.10 3 But they did not extend it. And although
great scholarly dispute remains over whether the adopted text of the
Amendment was a mere technical correction of Article IIIjurisdiction
or a broader grant of state sovereign immunity, the fact remains that
even if the latter theory is embraced, the text of the Amendment ap-
plies only to a "suit in law or equity." In other words, it is possible to
believe that the Adopters of the Eleventh Amendment intended to
prevent suits by individuals against their own states under federal
question jurisdiction (as, for example, regarding the construction of
treaties), and did not intend to bar admiralty cases from federal
court.
10 4
Additionally, the adopted text places emphasis on the manner in
which a state is haled into federal court. Once again, the Amendment
applies only to actions "commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States .... " In the Adopters' legal conception, this formula-
tion would have made little sense with actions brought in rem against
a property, to which title or possession is claimed by a state. Com-
pared even with Representative Sedgwick's first cut at a draft in
1793,105 and many of the proposals emanating from the states, 0 6 the
finally adopted text of the Eleventh Amendment seemed to doubly
exclude in rem actions brought under the maritime law: it neither
mentioned suits (or libels) in admiralty, nor contemplated actions in
which a state had a less than direct interest.
C. Admiralty Cases in the Amendment's Aftermath
A few final pieces of evidence can close these thoughts on the
adoption of the Eleventh Amendment. At the same time that the
Eleventh Amendment was being considered in Congress and ratified
by the states, other cases were being filed under the original jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court. One of these was Cutting v. South Caro-
103 'This is especially true since the Act of Feb. 13,1801, § 11, 2 Stat. 92 (1801),
granted federal question jurisdiction to the federal circuit courts. The statute was,
however, repealed the following year. See Act of Mar. 8, 1802, 2 Stat. 132 (1802). It
was not re-enacted until 1875. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1152
n.12 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (describing further the significance of this short-
lived experiment with federal question jurisdiction).
104 But see Fletcher, supra note 69, at 1061 (linking the two by noting that the
failure to mention admiralty cases "suggests that the adopters did not intend to forbid
suits in admiralty, just as their failure to mention in-state citizens suggests that they
did not intend to forbid federal question suits"); see also Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1150
(Souter, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Fletcher).
105 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
106 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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lina,10 7 where the plaintiff served as the administrator for the Prince
of Luxembourg. The suit arose over a ship chartered for use in the
American Revolution by the State of South Carolina. The vessel was,
however, captured by the British, and Luxembourg (through Cutting)
sued South Carolina for breach of the charter.108 Cutting filed an
original action in the Supreme Court in 1796; the Court issued a de-
fault judgment against South Carolina the following year, and a jury
empanelled by the Supreme Court awarded Cutting damages in the
amount of $55,002.84.109 Before the Court could issue a final decree
against South Carolina, the Eleventh Amendment completed its ratifi-
cation process, and the case was dismissed by the Court for lack of
jurisdiction in view of the amendment.110
Some may cite this as evidence that the Eleventh Amendment was
construed, at the time of its adoption, as a bar against admiralty ac-
tions, despite the fact that the explicit language of the Amendment
did not reach such suits. This might be true, except that Cutting was
not an action in admiralty and was certainly not initiated as an in rem
proceeding. The case was itself styled as an action in law, and it was
questionable whether (under the precedents of English admiralty) an
action for breach of a charter was even within the jurisdiction of the
admiralty.' Cutting, therefore, provides no authority regarding the
contemporary understandings of the Adopters as to the application of
the Eleventh Amendment to suits or libels in admiralty.
Better evidence of the immediate post-ratification understanding
of the Eleventh Amendment can probably be gleaned from the
Supreme Court's handling of another case, Penhallow v. Doane's Admin-
istrators.112 This case arose out of a dispute to a prize taken in 1777
during the Revolutionary War, in which the New Hampshire Court of
Admiralty had condemned a vessel, the Lusanna, to the crew of the
107 Cutting v. South Carolina, Case File; Minutes, Feb. 29, Aug. 6, 1796; Docket 31
(U.S.).
108 See Mathis, supra note 21, at 228.
109 Cutting v. South Carolina, Case File; Minutes, Feb. 8, 10, Aug. 8, 11, 1797
(U.S.).
110 See South Carolina v. French Republic & Cutting, Case File. Minutes, Aug. 15,
1797, Feb. 14, 1798; Docket 49 (U.S.).
111 See 1 STEVEN F. FRIEDELL, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY. JURISDICTION AND PRINCIPLES
§§ 50 & 51, at 3-22 to 3-25 (1996). The indeterminate jurisdiction of the admiralty
courts was a problem that had been noted in THE FEDERALIST No. 37, supra note 36, at
221 (James Madison). See also STORY, supra note 36, §§ 1665-1673, at 498-506. Justice
Joseph Story, writing much after the Cutting case, might have been disposed to have
included a contractual action for breach of a ship charter within the admiralty juris-
diction, but he was not explicit on that point. See id. § 1671, at 503.
112 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54 (1795).
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privateer (operated by John Penhallow) that had captured it.11 Eli-
sha Doane was the owner of the brig, and he sought an appeal from
the New Hampshire court to the appeals committee of Congress.
Leave to appeal was denied, but Doane insisted and took his case to
Congress anyway.' 14 After some delay, the matter was referred to the
new Court of Appeals created under the Articles of Confederation,
and, after very substantial briefing and argument before the court, it
reversed the New Hampshire Admiralty Court's decision and ordered
the return of the Lusanna to Doane." 5
The New Hampshire authorities refused to comply with the deci-
sion, and years of desultory correspondence followed between the
captors, Elisha Doane, New Hampshire officials, and Congress. 1 6 But
Doane had the last laugh. Following the creation of the district courts
in 1789, he filed in the federal district court (and thence transferred
to the federal circuit court)1 7 in New Hampshire for the enforcement
of the Court of Capture's decree. New Hampshire officials protested
that Doane's renewed action offended state sovereignty and was,
moreover, barred by the Eleventh Amendment." 8 Doane's position
prevailed in the circuit court, and the Supreme Court affirmed in a
decision handed down in 1795.119 New Hampshire renewed its pro-
tests in Congress, 20 which referred them to a committee chaired by
James Madison; the committee rebuffed them.' 21
Manifestly, the Adopters of the Eleventh Amendment did not re-
gard the Eleventh Amendment as a bar to a federal court ordering a
state official to convey a res, a vessel or prize proceeds to a particular
individual. Unlike Cutting, there was no doubt that the underlying
action was one initiated in rem within the admiralty jurisdiction of a
court.' 22 New Hampshire was free to interpose its claim to the res, but
113 See id. at 54-63.
114 See BOURGUINGNON, supra note 27, at 242-44.
115 See id. at 244-51; see also Doane's Adm'r v. Penhallow, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 218 (C.
P., Phila. County 1787) (describing how Doane unsuccessfully tried to enforce his
judgment from the Confederation Court of Appeals by attaching Penhallow's prop-
erty in Philadelphia).
116 See BOURGUIGNON, supra note 27, at 310-17.
117 See Penha//ow, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 62.
118 See 10 AMERIcAN STATE PAPERs: 1 MISCELLANEOUS 79, 81, 124 (1834).
119 SeePenhallow, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) at 118.
120 See 10 AMvRICAN STATE PAPERs: 1 MiscuL.LANEous 124 (1834).
121 See id. at 123; see also Gibbons, supra note 23, at 1938-39.
122 See Penha/!ow, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 86 (Patterson, J.)
Whether the [federal] District Court of New Hampshire had jurisdiction; or,
in other words, whether the libel exhibited before that court, was the proper
remedy[,] ... [o]n this point I entertain no doubts.... The property was
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it could not (according to the Supreme Court's decision in Doane)
thereby oust federal court jurisdiction based on the Eleventh
Amendment.
III. FASHIONING AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
AND ADMIRALTY
Justice Joseph Story, writing somewhat later in his Commentaries on
the Constitution of the United States, directly addressed the question
whether the Eleventh Amendment applied to actions in admiralty di-
rected against states. He wrote:
It has been doubted, whether this amendment [the Eleventh
Amendment] extends to cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdic-
tion, where the proceeding is in rem and not in personam. There [in
an in rem action] the jurisdiction of the court is founded upon the
possession of the thing; and if the state should interpose a claim for
the property, it does not act merely in the character of a defendant,
but as an actor. Besides, the language of the amendment is, that
"the judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity." But a suit in the admiralty is not,
correctly speaking, a suit in law or in equity, but is often spoken of
in contradistinction to both. 12
3
Story's views-not only as a sitting Justice of the Supreme Court,
but also as among the great successors of the Framing generation-
are entitled to some weight and were, moreover, echoed in the writ-
ings of other publicists, including Peter DuPonceau who concluded
that "[i] t has been held that this restriction [in the Eleventh Amend-
ment] does not extend to cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdic-
tion."1 24 Nevertheless, Story's views must be carefully assessed because
of his self-professed desire to extend the admiralty jurisdiction, partic-
not restored to the libellants, nor were they compensated in damages; of
course the decree in their favour remains unsatisfied. They had no remedy
at common law; they had none in equity; the only forum competent to give
redress is the District Court of New Hampshire, because it has admiralty ju-
risdiction. There they applied, and, in my opinion, with great propriety.
Id.
123 STORY, supra note 36, § 1689, at 475 (citing United States v. Bright, 24 F. Gas.
1232 (C.C.D. Pa. 1809) (No. 14,647), Governor of Ga. v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110
(1828), and United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809)).
124 PETER S. DUPONCEAU, A BRIEF VIEW OF THE CONsTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 38 (Philadelphia 1834).
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ularly as a vehicle to increase the power of the federal government
(and courts) at the expense of the states. 25
Story's and DuPonceau's deductions concerning the extent of
the Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional bar in suits in admiralty
brought by individuals against States stemmed from a series of cases
before the Supreme Court beginning in 1809. From these cases, a
general rule could be derived that the Eleventh Amendment did not
bar federal courts from hearing admiralty in rem cases brought
against states. It is exceedingly important, however, to carefully ana-
lyze these decisions.
A. Peters and Bright: The Understanding Articulated
The first case was United States v. Peters,'26 a decision coming in
the later stages of ajudicial saga that reached back to the Revolution
and virtually identical to the facts and procedural posture presented
in Penhallow v. Doane's Administrators.'27 The Peters case involved an
American sailor, Gideon Olmstead, a citizen of Connecticut, who in
1778 had been captured and pressed into service by the British sloop
Active. Olmstead led a mutiny and took control of the sloop. Just
after Olmstead's band had assumed command, though, an armed brig
belonging to the State of Pennsylvania, the Convention, came along-
side and claimed the Active as a prize, and the vessel was, indeed, later
condemned in a prize proceeding in the Pennsylvania Court of Admi-
ralty.' 28 Olmstead and his associates, however, received from the
jury's verdict only a quarter share of the prize, even though they
claimed they were the exclusive captors of the vessel.' 29
Olmstead immediately appealed the Pennsylvania admiralty
court's decision to the committee of the Continental Congress
charged with resolving such matters. This was the committee upon
which Edmund Randolph had served in Congress, and which had
125 This point has been emphatically made by recent courts. See Welch v. Texas
Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 493 n.25 (1987)
Moreover, Justice Story was noted for his expansive view of the admiralty
jurisdiction of federal courts. See, e.g., . . . Note, 37 Am. L. Rev. 911, 916
(1903) ("It was said of the late Justice Story, that if a bucket of water were
brought into his court with a corn cob floating in it, he would have at once
extend the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States over it.").
Id.
126 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809).
127 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54 (1795).
128 The decision of the Pennsylvania Court of Admiralty, along with its jury's ver-
dict, was reprinted in Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 120-21.
129 See BOURGUIGNON, supra note 27, at 101-04; JACOBS, supra note 17, at 77.
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been the predecessor of the Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture,
created under the Articles of Confederation. The committee which
heard Olmstead's appeal included such legal luminaries as Oliver Ells-
worth (the drafter of the Judiciary Act of 1789), and it voted to reverse
the Pennsylvania admiralty court's decision and declare that Olmstead
and his associates were the exclusive captors of the prize.' 30 However,
the Pennsylvania courts refused to recognize Congress's decision and,
moreover, refused to pay Olmstead even his quarter share of the prize
money, ledgering it into the accounts of the state treasurer. What en-
sued was a political stand-off between Pennsylvania officials and the
Continental Congress, each side claiming that it was to have the last
say as to the disposition of vessels taken as prize during the War.' 3 ' As
a result, Olmstead never received any prize money, and Congress grew
worried about the problems inherent in concurrent state and national
jurisdiction in maritime cases,132 anxieties that led to the creation of
the Appellate Prize Court under the Confederation and also the
granting of admiralty jurisdiction to the federal courts under the
Constitution.
The Revolution ended, time passed, and still Olmstead had never
been paid. Every time he applied to the State Treasurer, David Ritten-
house, for the funds that had been escrowed on his behalf, he was
rebuffed. Olmstead filed a second action in the federal district court
in Pennsylvania in 1803 and obtained a favorable judgment from
Judge Peters, ordering Rittenhouse's heirs to hand the money over to
Olmstead. 133 The Pennsylvania legislature immediately passed a stat-
ute declaring Judge Peters's decision a nullity and ordered the estate
of the deceased state treasurer to pay the proceeds into the Penn-
sylvania treasury. 34
Upon application for a writ of mandamus by Olmstead, the
Supreme Court ordered district court Judge Peters to issue execution
of the judgment. The Court rejected the State's argument that the
Eleventh Amendment barred the suit by holding that the suit was ac-
tually filed against the executrix of the state treasurer's estate and not
against the State itself.'3 5 The Supreme Court interpreted the amend-
ment to not affect the right of a State to bring suit in federal court on
130 See Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 121-23; BOURGUIGNON, supra note 27, at 104-05.
131 See BOURGUIGNON, supra note 27, at 105-12.
132 See Holt, supra note 33, at 1427-30.
133 Judge Peters's decision is reprinted in Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 124-26.
134 The Pennsylvania legislative acts are reprinted in Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at
124, 127-34. At that time, state treasurers were personally liable for the accounts of
the state.
135 See Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 139; see also Gibbons, supra note 23, at 1943-44.
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its own behalf.'3 6 Chief Justice John Marshall, writing for a unani-
mous Court, went on to hold that
it certainly can never be alleged, that a mere suggestion of title in a
state to property, in possession of an individual, must arrest the pro-
ceedings of the court, and prevent their looking into the sugges-
tion, and examining the validity of the title.
Since, then, the state of Pennsylvania had neither possession of,
nor right to, the property on which the sentence of the district
court was pronounced, and since the suit was neither commenced
nor prosecuted against that state, there remains no pretext for the
allegation that the case is within the [Eleventh] amendment; and,
consequently, the state of Pennsylvania can possess no constitu-
tional right to resist the legal process which may be directed in this
cause.
137
The Court's decision in Peters was not controlled by the fact that
Olmstead's claim to the proceeds of the prize money for the Active
was one based in admiralty. What was important for the Court was
thatJudge Peters's decision was simply in the form of injunctive relief
directed to a state officer who, under color of state law, was depriving
an individual of a federally derived right (in Olmstead's case, the deci-
sion granted by the Congressional committee of appeal for captures).
In this sense, Peters was a forerunner of the Court's jurisprudence of
Ex parte Young, which carved out an exception to the Eleventh Amend-
ment for injunctive actions brought against state officers holding
property without any colorable claim.'38 Moreover, it seemed to
weigh on the Court that Olmstead's action was one that had always
proceeded in rem, and that Pennsylvania's interest in the suit was
tangential.
If this had been the end of the Olmstead saga, it would still pro-
vide persuasive evidence that the Eleventh Amendment was never in-
tended to apply to in rem admiralty actions in which states had
interposed themselves. But it was not, and events took a bizarre turn.
When the U.S. Supreme Court announced its decision, the Governor
of Pennsylvania responded by deploying the state militia around the
home of the Rittenhouse heirs in order to prevent service of process
of the writ of execution for Judge Peters's earlier decision. A clash
between two armed groups-one led by the U.S. Marshal (under or-
136 See Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 139.
137 Id. at 139-40, 141.
138 Compare Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 690
(1982) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (establishing a three-prong test to determine if
such suits were permissible), with id. at 713-17 (White, J., dissenting and concurring)
(arguing for the adoption of a "colorable claim" standard).
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ders to serve the process), the other led by state militia officers-
seemed imminent until President Madison indicated that he would
use his powers to enforce the Supreme Court's decision on behalf of
Olmstead. The Pennsylvania authorities backed down, and their hu-
miliation was complete when a federal indictment was returned
against General Michael Bright, the militia commander who had forci-
bly resisted the U.S. Marshal. l' 9
Bright and the Pennsylvania authorities objected to the jurisdic-
tion of the federal circuit court on the grounds of the Eleventh
Amendment.' 4° Riding circuit, Justice Bushrod Washington denied
the objection, noting that "[e]very reason is opposed to the construc-
tion contended for by [Bright's] counsel; and to our apprehension
there is not one sound reason in favor of it."114 Washington held,
first, that since the suit was not filed against the State, and since the
State had entered the case to press its own interests, the Eleventh
Amendment did not bar the suit.' 42 This was simply a repeating of
the Supreme Court's holding in Peters.'43
Washington went on to write, however, that "[w] e think that the
amendment to the constitution does not extend to suits of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction."144 Washington based his decision on the
plain language of the Eleventh Amendment and the fear that by inter-
preting it to include language that was not in the text of the Amend-
ment he would be opening the door for a construction which
destroyed the intent of the original drafters:
Would we be justified by any rule of law in admitting such an inter-
polation [of admiralty cases into the Eleventh Amendment], even if
a reason could not be assigned for the omission of those words in
the amendment itself? I think not. In our various struggles to get at
the spirit and intention of the framers of the constitution, I fear that
this invariable charter of our rights would, in a very little time, be
entirely construed away, and become at length so disfigured that its
founders would recollect very few of its original features. 45
139 SeeJACOBS, supra note 17, at 80.
140 United States v. Bright, 24 F. Cas. 1232, 1234 (C.C.D. Pa. 1809) (No. 14,647).
141 Id. at 1235.
142 See id. ("It is certain that the suit in the district court was not commenced or
prosecuted against the state of Pennsylvania. She was in no respect a party to that
suit.").
143 But see Gibbons, supra note 23, at 1945 (suggesting that Washington went fur-
ther on this point than Marshall's decision in Peters).
144 Bright, 24 F. Cas. at 1236.
145 Id.
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Here was a plea for restraint in constitutional interpretation, all the
more remarkable in that it was made just a few years after the adop-
tion of the Eleventh Amendment!
But Justice Washington did not stop with a paean to intelligent
textualism. He went on to observe that there "appears to be a solid
reason for the limitation of the amendment to cases at law and in
equity."' 46 The limitation lay in the key distinction between suits in
law or equity, and those in admiralty. In the former, Washington
wrote, the state must be made a party and enforcement of ajudgment
acts directly against the state:
But in cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction the property in
dispute is generally in the possession of the court, or of persons
bound to produce it, or its equivalent, and the proceedings are in
rem. The court decides in whom the right is, and distributes the
proceeds accordingly. In such a case the court need not depend
upon the good will of a state claiming an interest in the thing to
enable it to execute its decree. All the world are parties to such a
suit, and of course are bound by the sentence. The state may inter-
pose her claim and have it decided. But she cannot lie by, and,
after the decree is passed say that she was a party, and therefore not
bound, for want ofjurisdiction in the court.147
Not content with relying on principles of constitutional interpre-
tation and the significant doctrinal differences between admiralty li-
bels in rem and other forms of action in law and in equity, Justice
Washington also made an important policy point. To accept Penn-
sylvania's position, he wrote, would place in jeopardy the legitimacy of
"the proceedings of a court of the law of nations, and in which all
nations are interested, [and] might be productive of the most serious
consequences to the general government, to whom are confided all
our relations with foreign governments." 48 It is important, though,
to note that this particular concern would probably be confined to
those in rem libels proceeding on the prize side of the admiralty
court, which was exactly the disposition of the underlying claim by
Gideon Olmstead. Justice Washington did not limit the possibility
that an in rem "instance" libel, perhaps arising from a collision be-
tween two vessels or the rendering of salvage services, might implicate
foreign affairs issues.
In any event, Justice Washington's decision in Bright seems a ring-
ing endorsement of the idea that the Eleventh Amendment does not
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id. Prize tribunals were often conceived of as "a court of the law of nations."
For more on this, see Bederman, supra note 20, "at 52 & n.105, 54.
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apply to admiralty libels in rem. 149 Admittedly, Washington was care-
ful in framing his decision on the distinction between in personam
process running against a state (or state official) and an in rem libel
against an object, thus avoiding what he acknowledged was the "deli-
cate" "subject" of effective execution of ajudgment against an uncon-
senting state.1 50
B. The Madrazo Cases: The Understanding Refined
Almost twenty years later, the Supreme Court was given the op-
portunity to rule again on the applicability of the Eleventh Amend-
ment to admiralty cases. Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo (Madrazo 1) 151
involved the capture of a slave ship, the Isabelita (owned by a Spanish
subject, Juan Madrazo), by an American pirate who then libelled the
human "property" in a "pretended Court of Admiralty" erected at Fer-
nandina, Amelia Island, Florida. The slaves were then sold to a Wil-
liam Bowen and thence found their way into Georgia, where they were
seized by United States customs officials. 152 The customs agent deliv-
ered the Africans to the Governor, who then sold some of them (with-
out any notice), while the remainder stayed in the possession of a state
appointed agent. The Isabelita was later restored to Madrazo, but
there remained the disputed claim to the slaves.
Madrazo brought a libel in rem in the federal district court of
Georgia to recover not only the unsold slaves but also the proceeds of
the earlier sale by the state. The Governor brought an information of
149 See also Massey, supra note 17, at 122-23. For a criticism of this holding, see
Gibbons, supra note 23, at 1945 n.306.
But see Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 491 n.23
(1987) (suggesting thatJustice Washington's Eleventh Amendment holding may have
been part of his charge to the jury, but wrongly concluding that his statements were
dicta).
150 See Bright, 24 F. Gas. at 1236; see also Fletcher, supra note 69, at 1079.
151 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110 (1828).
152 See id. at 110-11. The slave trade had been outlawed by an act of Congress in
March 1807, Act to Prohibit the Importation of Slaves into any Port or Place within
the Jurisdiction of the United States, ch. 22, 2 Stat. 426 (1807), as was contemplated
in the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. Madrazo Iwas closely linked to
another cause c~l~bre decided by the Supreme Court, The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 66 (1825). For more on the background of this case, see JOHN T. NOONAN,
JR., THE ANTELOPE: THE ORDEAL OF THE RECAPTURED AFRICANS IN THE ADMINISTRA-
TIONS OF JAMES MONROE AND JOHN QUINCY ADAMS (1977).
Also significant to the Madrazo I case was a Georgia law, also passed in 1807,
which gave to the governor the power to receive slaves forfeited under federal law and
to dispose of them in a manner advantageous to the state. See Act of Dec. 19, 1817,
1817 Ga. Laws 78; see also Gibbons, supra note 23, at 1962 & n.392.
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forfeiture to gain title to all the slaves and, by accepting a monition
from the district court, accepted in personam jurisdiction by the fed-
eral admiralty court. Bowen also joined the suit to claim title to the
slaves.' 53 The district court dismissed both Madrazo's libel and
Bowen's claim and affirmed the Governor's information. Madrazo ap-
pealed to the federal circuit court, 54 which reversed, and granted
Madrazo's libel against the Governor and State of Georgia. The Gov-
ernor, John Clark, appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. 55
Governor Clark's attorney in the Supreme Court specifically fo-
cused his argument on the proposition that the Eleventh Amendment
barred Madrazo's action. John MacPherson Berrien noted that the
"spirit" of the Amendment was such as to apply to actions in admi-
ralty.' 56 "Proceedings in admiralty, are suits in law," he submitted,
"[d] oes the admiralty proceed without law, according to the will of the
judge?" 5 7 Moreover, he argued that
[tihe objections made by the states to their liability, before the
amendment of the constitution, was not to the mode by which the
suit was instituted; but to the fact of their being made answerable to
the courts of the Union. To restrict the amendment to cases of
common law and equity, would not, therefore, have afforded an ad-
equate remedy to the alleged grievance.' 58
Realizing, though, that the text of the Amendment was against
him on this score, Berrien went on to make two other points. The
first was that, assuming that the Eleventh Amendment did not apply to
admiralty actions, Madrazo was obliged to have filed his case as an
original action in the Supreme Court (as a matter brought by "for-
eign States, Citizens or Subjects" against a state), and not in the dis-
trict court. 59 Second, Berrien argued that the district court did not,
in any event, have jurisdiction over the res in the in rem action be-
cause a warrant of arrest had never been served on the slaves in the
state agent's custody. Governor Clark had merely stipulated that the
slaves would be held "subject to the jurisdiction of th[e] Court."160
153 See Madrazo I, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 111-12.
154 Federal circuit courts had appellate jurisdiction over the admiralty and forfei-
ture judgments of district courts, pursuant to sections 21 and 22 of the Judiciary Act
of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 83-84 (1789).
155 See Madrazo , 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 112.
156 See id. at 114-15 (argument ofJohn Berrien).
157 Id. at 115.
158 Id.
159 See id. at 115-16; see also U.S. CONsT. art. Im, § 2, ci. 1.
160 See Madrazo I, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 112 (statement of the case), 115-16 (argu-
ment of counsel).
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Chief Justice John Marshall, writing for the Court, grasped these
arguments as a way to craft a compromise result. He was clearly wor-
ried about the ability of the federal government to enforce a decision
in Georgia.161 The Court, therefore, affirmed the dismissal of the gov-
ernor's forfeiture claim since a state could not have good title to slaves
illegally exported into the United States in violation of the Act of 1807
banning that trade, pursuant to the Constitution. The Court also dis-
missed Madrazo's admiralty in rem claim by holding that since the
district court did not have possession of the slaves at the time of the
decision (because of the imperfected arrest), it was actually a proceed-
ing in personam. 162
The decree cannot be sustained as against the state, because, if the
l1th amendment to the constitution does not extend to proceed-
ings in admiralty, it was a case for the original jurisdiction of the
supreme court. It cannot be sustained as a suit, prosecuted not
against the state, but against the thing; because the thing was not in
possession of the district court.163
Marshall thus avoided an express holding that the Eleventh Amend-
ment did not apply to admiralty in rem proceedings against a state by
holding it was not an admiralty proceeding in rem at all. It was just an
in personam case against the Governor himself, acting in his official
capacity.' 64 However, the opinion stopped short of ordering the spe-
cific performance of Madrazo's claim.165 Madrazo would have to sue
for a separate judgment to obtain money from the state treasury for
the sale of the seized slaves and the slaves remaining in the custody of
the state.
In Ex parte Juan Madrazzo (Madrazo I1) ,166 Madrazo (ostensibly in-
formed of Marshall's jurisdictional views from Madrazo 1) attempted to
invoke the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to "award admiralty
process against the State of Georgia ... to show cause why the pro-
161 See Gibbons, supra note 23, at 1966.
162 Cf Madrazo I, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 131-32 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (arguing that
Georgia had consented to the suit by filing a stipulation that the res would be kept at
the disposal of the federal district court).
163 Id. at 124.
164 See id. at 123-24. For more on Madrazo las an officers' suit, see Larson v. Domes-
tic &Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 711 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See
aISoJAcOBS, supra note 17, at 103-05; 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 400 (1963).
165 See Madrazo I, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 135 (remanding the case to the circuit court
"with directions for further proceedings, to be had thereon, according to law and
justice, in conformity to this opinion").
166 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 627 (1833). Notice the difference in spelling between the two
cases.
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ceeds of the said slaves, paid into the treasury of said state, should not
be paid over to the libellant [Madrazo], [and] the slaves remaining in
the possession of the state restored to him."'67 Marshall held simply
that
[t]his is not a case where the property is in custody of a court of
admiralty, or brought within its jurisdiction, and in the possession
of any private person; it is not, therefore, one for the exercise of
thatjurisdiction. It is a mere personal suit against a state, to recover
proceeds in its possession, and in such a case, no private person has
a right to commence an original suit in this court against a state.168
In other words, this was an in personarn action brought against a
state (whether denominated in admiralty or otherwise), a kind of case
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Madrazo IT impliedly left open
the possibility that a properly perfected in rem libel could be brought
in the Supreme Court, and even if a state interposed a claim, jurisdic-
tion would not be denied under the Eleventh Amendment.
Marshall's combined decisions in the Madrazo cases were, as al-
ready suggested, a masterful political solution to the problem of Geor-
gia's defiance of federal authority. But they were premised on some
false assumptions of federal jurisdiction. The first, and relatively mi-
nor, issue was the ineffectiveness of the stipulation made by Governor
Clark that the res which was the subject of the action (the slaves and
derivative proceeds held in the treasury) would be held at the disposal
of the circuit court. To the extent the circuit court could hear appeals
in admiralty from the district court, 6 9 it surely was empowered to is-
sue all writs in pursuance and in protection of its jurisdiction.17 0
Marshall's more serious misstep was in thinking that an in rem
admiralty action initiated by an individual, in which a state interposed
a claim to the res, was within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court. The Judiciary Act of 1789 did not so provide. In-
stead, it gave exclusive jurisdiction to the Supreme Court "of all con-
troversies of a civil nature, where a state is a party, except... between a
state and citizens of other states, or aliens, in which latter case it shall
have original but not exclusive jurisdiction."171 Assuming (as Chief
Justice Marshall said he did) that the Eleventh Amendment did not
167 Id. at 631 (submission of counsel).
168 Id. at 632.
169 SeeJudiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 24, 1 Stat. 73, 85 (1789).
170 See id. § 14, 1 Stat. at 81-82. Justice Johnson, in dissent in Madrazo , ably made
this point. See Madrazo I, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 132-35; see also Gibbons, supra note 23, at
1967 n.427.
171 Judiciary Act of 1789 § 13, 1 Stat. at 80 (original emphasis); see also Massey,
supra note 17, at 125 & n.316.
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apply to admiralty actions, the proper court to file any admiralty ac-
tion (whether one proceeding in personam or in rem) would have
been a federal district court under section nine of the Judiciary Act of
1789.172 Moreover, Article III of the Constitution made clear that ad-
miralty and maritime causes were not within the Supreme Court's
original and exclusive jurisdiction. 173 Nor could even Congress author-
ize the Supreme Court to hear an original proceeding in admiralty. 174
As Justice Johnson noted in his dissent in Madrazo I, "[n]ow, it is very
clear, that wherever the District Court is vested with 'exclusive original
cognizance,' the Supreme Court can possess no original jurisdiction;
and such is clearly the case with regard to . . . suits in the
admiralty." 175
There was, moreover, a jurisdictional trap in Marshall's sugges-
tion: in an in rem action, how was a libellant to know (in advance)
whether a state would be a claimant? If a party filed a libel in district
court and a state interposed a claim, under Marshall's theory, the ac-
tion would have to be dismissed. But, if (as Madrazo did in his second
action) a party brought an original action in the Supreme Court, and
the state (or state officer) did not interpose a claim, then the action
was not properly one "where a state is a party," and would also be
dismissed. The far more logical position was the one advocated by
Justice Johnson: that an in rem libel in admiralty could be filed in
federal district court, and even if a state interposed a claim, it would
not be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. In any event, the impor-
tant point that all the justices seemed to agree on in the Madrazo
cases, as well as in Peters and Bright, was that an in rem admiralty ac-
tion, when properly commenced and pursued, could never be con-
strued to be an action "commenced or prosecuted" against a state,
and thus could not be barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
IV. THE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY REVOLUTION
That the Eleventh Amendment did not block in rem libels
brought in admiralty was the rule of law for the next ninety years.
Nevertheless, by the mid-nineteenth century a jurisprudential revolu-
tion was taking place within the doctrine of sovereign immunity. It
began subtly enough with a series of decisions on the immunities en-
172 Judiciary Act of 1789, §9, 1 Stat. at 76.
173 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
174 An analogous problem was the issue on the merits in Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
175 Madrazo , 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 129-30 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (quoting from
Judiciary Act of 1789, § 9, 1 Stat. at 76).
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joyed by the vessels owned and operated by foreign sovereigns. 176
And although the immunities of foreign sovereigns may be analogous
to those enjoyed by the United States in its own courts, the connection
with the immunities possessed by states in a federal union seems more
attenuated. 177
Much more pertinent to the problem of the application of the
Eleventh Amendment to actions in admiralty was a series of cases de-
cided by the Supreme Court as to the immunities of the federal gov-
ernment. As has occurred in many areas of Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence, doctrines of federal sovereign immunity have been
merged into the law concerning states' Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity.178 Although relatively unnoticed by judges or commentators, 179
exactly the same process of merger has occurred in admiralty cases,
with predictably curious and distortive effects.
176 See, e.g., The L'invincible, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 238 (1816); The Schooner Ex-
change v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812); see also Stefan A. Riesenfeld,
Sovereign Immunity of Foreign Vessels in Anglo-American Law: The Evolution of a Legal Doc-
trine, 25 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1940).
Mistakenly included in discussions of cases standing for the proposition of abso-
lute sovereign immunity for foreign owned or operated vessels is The Santissima Trini-
dad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283 (1822), where a U.S. court did exercise jurisdiction over a
vessel brought into neutral, American waters as an illegal prize. See Bederman, supra
note 20, at 56-57 (discussing this case). But see Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways &
Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 493 n.26 (1987) (citing the case for the general
proposition).
The question of the sovereign immunities of foreign vessels in English courts was
only settled with The Parlement Beige, 5 P.D. 197, 219-20 (Eng. 1880), which held that
an in rem action against foreign sovereign vessel was barred. This case marked the
complete reversal of The Prins Frederik, 2 Dods. 451, 165 Eng. Rep. 1543 (Adm. 1820),
which had permitted such suits.
177 This point was made by the dissent in Welch, 483 U.S. at 500 n.4 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
178 The leading such area is the ability to sue a governmental officer and to not
have such a suit barred by sovereign immunity. Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence
concerning suits against state officers who, while acting under color of state law, are
depriving an individual of a federally derived right, have been substantially influenced
by cases involving federal officers. See, e.g., Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors,
Inc., 458 U.S. 670 (1982) (state officers); Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643 (1962)
(federal officers); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682
(1949) (federal officers); Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204 (1897) (state officers);
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882) (federal officers).
For more on this phenomenon of merger between state and federal sovereign
immunities, see Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity
Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 515 (1977).
179 But see Treasure Salvors, 458 U.S. at 710 n.6 (White, J., dissenting) (discussing
some federal sovereign immunity decisions in admiralty in an Eleventh Amendment
case).
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A. Federal Sovereign Immunity in Admiralty
In 1868, the Supreme Court heard a maritime tort case involving
the prize ship, Siren. This steamer had been captured in the harbor
at Charleston, South Carolina, attempting to run the Union blockade
of the Confederacy in 1865. As the vessel was being brought into New
York Harbor under the command of a Union prize crew, she negli-
gently ran into and sank another ship, the Harper. The owners of
that ship intervened in the government's condemnation of its prize in
the Federal District Court of Massachusetts, to recover damages for
the loss of their ship. The United States claimed that the district court
had no jurisdiction over such a suit by reason of federal sovereign
immunity. 80
Justice Stephen Field first laid out the common law doctrine of
sovereign immunity and the policy reasons which supported the doc-
trine. He stated that "inconvenience and danger" would follow any
other rule that would permit "the supreme authority [to] be subjected
to suit at the instance of every citizen." 81 It would interfere with pub-
lic safety and service and prevent the usual administration of govern-
mental duties. Without a specific act of Congress waiving immunity,
the United States could not be haled into court.
However, Field went on to note that
when the United States institute a suit, they waive their exemption
so far as to allow a presentation by the defendant of set-offs, legal
and equitable, to the extent of the demand made or property
claimed, and when they proceed in ren, they open to consideration
all claims and equities in regard to the property libelled. 18 2
He explained that, under ordinary circumstances, when a vessel
which is the property of the United States commits a maritime tort, a
cause of action arises against that vessel. Because the vessel is govern-
ment property, "for reasons of public policy... [the claim] cannot be
enforced by direct proceedings against the vessel. It stands ... like a
claim against the government, incapable of enforcement without its
consent, and unavailable for any purpose."183 In dicta, he expanded
180 See The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 152-53 (1868).
181 Id. at 154.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 155; see also United States v. The Cargo of the Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S.
(2 How.) 210, 233-34 (1844) (expanding on the concept of in rem liability of an
object).
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this holding to include maritime contract liens, including those for
mariners' wages.184
But in an in rem prize proceeding, since the government insti-
tuted the action for judicial sale of the prize ship upon which claims
existed, it had waived its immunity. This meant it had given the prize
court the right to determine how the sale proceeds, which had been
paid into the court's registry, should be directed.18 5 So the general
rule from The Siren is that an admiralty claim will arise against a feder-
ally owned vessel for a maritime tort, but, due to public policy, the
claim cannot be enforced., An exception to this rule comes about
when the federal government itself institutes an in rem libel and sub-
jects itself to the jurisdiction of a court, as in a prize proceeding. In
such a case, the federal government stands as a private party against
the existing claimants. 86
A year later, the Supreme Court heard a case in salvage brought
by the captain of a vessel which had saved the personal property of the
federal government from destruction aboard the Davis.18 7 Justice
Miller stated the two issues before the Court as, first, whether the per-
sonal property of the federal government is subject to a lien for sal-
vage services rendered in saving the property, and, second, whether
such a lien, if it did exist, may be enforced. As to the first issue, Miller
quickly held that the lien did arise, citing numerous cases in
support. 88
"The second of the questions above stated," Justice Miller noted
with some understatement, "presents the more difficult problem." 8 9
After looking to The Siren and a Massachusetts decision, Briggs v. Light-
Boats, °90 he stated the general rule that "no suit in rem can be main-
184 The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 157 (discussing, without citing, the Pennsylvania
Admiralty Court's decision in Moitez). For more on the'Moitez opinion, see supra note
30 and accompanying text).
185 See id. at 159.
186 This was the rule observed in England at the time of the Revolution. See supra
note 20 and accompanying text.
187 See The Davis, 77 U.S. (0 Wall.) 15 (1869).
188 See id. at 18.
189 Id. at 19.
190 93 Mass. (11 Allen) 157 (1865). In Briggs, a maritime lien attached to a vessel
before the United States purchased it. The lien holder sought to enforce the lien in
Massachusetts state courts. Such relief was denied because the Massachusetts
Supreme Court properly ruled that an in personam action against the United States
was not possible without an express-waiver of sovereign immunity by Congress, which
was not forthcoming here. Yet, in what had to be dicta (because a state court could
not offer an in rem remedy, see supra note 49 and accompanying text), it was held
that the government's possession of property could not be disturbed by a suit in rem.
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tained against the property of the United States when it would be nec-
essary to take such property out of the possession of the government
by any writ or process of the court."191
Applying this general rule to the specific facts of the case, Miller
sought to give it a liberal construction in order to promote justice. 92
He stated that the law recognizes the existence of the lien for salvage
and that enforcement against the government was permissible so long
as no process was needed and the possession of the government would
not be disturbed. The key question for the Court, then, was "what
shall constitute a possession which, in reference to this matter, pro-
tects the goods from the process of the court?" 93 Miller replied that
government possession must be actual, not constructive or implied by
ownership of personal property, and that it "can only exist through
some of its officers, using that phrase in the sense of any person
charged on behalf of the government with the control of the property,
coupled with its actual possession." 94 In this case, the goods that had
been the subject of salvage were in the possession of the master of the
private ship, the Davis, and not the government. Therefore, the lien
for salvage existed and could be enforced. 195
The Davis was an immensely significant holding. The rule of that
case permits an in rem action to be instituted, even where the United
States is an obvious (or the only) claimant, so long as the res being
disputed is not within the actual possession of the federal government
or its officers. If the disputed property is not in the possession of the
government at all, or at most can be deemed to be constructively held
by the United States, the suit can proceed.' 96 This position strikes a
191 TheDavis, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 19.
192 See id. at 20-21.
193 Id. at 21.
194 Id.
195 See id. at 22; see also Goldsmith v. The Revenue Cutter, 6 Or. 250, 252-53 (1877)
(holding, in a case similar to Brigs, that a federally owned vessel was in the actual
possession of the United States and that, therefore, no "warrant" could issue).
The Supreme Court later refined The Davis holding in The Western Maid, 257 U.S.
419 (1922), in which Justice Holmes held that if a lien purportedly attached to a
vessel in actual government service (and thus was not enforceable in rem), it re-
mained unenforceable in rem even if the vessel was later transferred to a private party
unprotected by sovereign immunity.
196 This rule was applied to cases involving other federal vessels. See United States
v. Morgan, 99 F. 570 (4th Cir. 1900) (deciding that the United States waived in per-
sonama immunity by statute for an implied maritime contract for towing and salvage
services, but no in rem proceeding is allowed); In reWhite Star Towing Co., 91 F. 285
(S.D. Ga. 1898) (holding that a prize ship in the control and possession of officers of
the United States is immune from maritime lien for salvage). The Davis and The Siren
were also applied, by analogy, to foreign sovereign vessels. See Long v. The Tampico,
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neat balance between two doctrinal extremes with the invocation of
federal sovereign immunity in admiralty libels: permitting all such
suits or barring all of them.197 It is a balance that survives today with
the statutory codifications made by Congress' 98 in this field, the Suits
in Admiralty Act' 99 and the Public Vessels Act.200
B. Municipal Immunities in Admiralty
A separate stream of cases, analogous to the Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity enjoyed by vessels owned by states, was presented in
decisions concerning vessels operated by municipalities. The case of
The Fidelit oI involved a maritime tort committed by a tug owned by
the city of New York, dedicated to public use and actually performing
a public service at the time of the incident. The district court dis-
missed the libel,20 2 and the matter was appealed. The federal circuit
court Justice Waite, riding circuit, affirmed, relying upon the general
proposition that public property devoted to public use and necessary
for carrying on the operations of government was not subject to
seizure and judicial sale. 20 3
The private libellant sought, however, to have the court find an
exception to this rule under the theory that the immunity from
seizure of government property stemmed from the immunity of the
government itself. Since the city of New York was subject to suit (be-
ing unprotected by the Eleventh Amendment as a municipality or
16 F. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1883) (holding that foreign sovereigns enjoy same immunity as
the United States, but when title to vessel has not passed to foreign sovereign, despite
contract, no immunity arises).
197 This was a compromise that seemed to be embraced in English admiralty law,
until such time as extremist principles of Crown immunity prevailed in Young v. The
S.S. Scotia, 1903 App. Cas. 501 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Newfoundland).
198 The earliest of these was the Merchant Shipping Act of 1916, ch. 451, § 9, 39
Stat. 730 (1916), which appeared to waive much federal sovereign immunity in this
area. See The Florence H., 248 F. 1012 (S.D.N.Y. 1918) (finding that where U.S. vessel
is chartered by foreign sovereign pursuant to 1916 Merchant Shipping Act, it is still
subject to all laws, regulations, and liabilities governing private merchant vessels); The
Ceylon Maru, 266 F. 396 (D. Md. 1920) (same).
199 Act of Mar. 9, 1920, ch. 95,41 Stat. 525 (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. app.
§§ 741-752 (1994)).
200 Act of Mar. 3, 1925, ch. 428, 43 Stat. 1112 (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C.
app. §§ 781-790 (1994)).
201 8 F. Cas. 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1878) (No. 4757), affd, 8 F. Cas. 1189 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1879) (No. 4758).
202 See The Fidelity, 8 F. Cas. at 1189 (citing The Seneca, 21 F. Cas. 1080 (E.D.N.Y.
1876) (No. 12,668)).
203 See The Fidelity, 8 F. Gas. 1189, 1190 (C.C.S.C.D.N.Y. 1879) (No. 4758) (citing
Klein v. New Orleans, 99 U.S. 149 (1878)).
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political subdivision of a state) ,204 ran the argument, the ship should
be subject to suit in rem.20 5 The circuit court rejected this, holding
that "[t]he simple right to sue, therefore, does not carry with it the
right to seize all property. It follows, necessarily, that the exemption
from seizure is not always the same thing as an exemption from
suit."
2 0 6
Justice Waite went on to explain the reasoning of this holding.
"A public vessel is part of the sovereignty to which she belongs, and
her liability is merged in that of the sovereign. '207 This meant that in
order to recover for a maritime tort, "redress must be sought from the
sovereign, and not from the instruments he uses in the exercise of his
legitimate functions." 208 The circuit court found support for this pur-
ported general rule of sovereign immunity in admiralty cases from a
selective and crabbed reading of the older English precedents. 20 9 Yet
this holding did not contradict The Siren or The Davis, since neither of
those cases involved the public use of public property.210 Indeed, Jus-
tice Waite was very careful to cite The Davis and to add that
"[p] roperty does not necessarily become a part of the sovereignty be-
cause it is owned by the sovereign. To make it so, it must be devoted
to the public use, and must be employed in carrying on the operations
of the government."21'
In any event, most later cases concerning city-owned vessels did
not strictly follow The Fidelity.21 2 In Workman v. Mayor of New York,213
204 See Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280-81 (1977); Lin-
coln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890).
205 See The Fidelity, 8 F. Cas. 1189, 1190-91 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879) (No. 4758).
206 Id. at 1191.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 See id. at 1191-92 (citing The Athol, 1 W. Rob. 374, 166 Eng. Rep. 613 (Adm.
1842), (stating the proposition that consent was required from the Lords of Admiralty
for the initiation of in rem libels, and distinguishing The Lord Hobart, 2 Dods. 100, 165
Eng. Rep. 1428 (Adm. 1815) and The Marquis Of Huntly, 3 Hag. Adm. 246, 166 Eng.
Rep. 397 (Adm. 1835), as being cases which "were, in form, suits in rem, but there was
no seizure and no bail"); see also supra note 19 and accompanying text.
Interestingly, Justice Waite relied upon a very late Admiralty Court precedent
from England (The Athol), that marked the transition of British courts to a more ex-
treme view of Crown immunity in in rem admiralty actions. See supra note 197.
210 See The Fidelity, 8 F. Cas. at 1191-92.
211 Id. at 1191 (citing The Davis, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 15 (1869)).
212 See the following cases which relied not upon the authority of The Fidelity so
much as the actual versus constructive possession distinction of The Davi. The John
McCraken, 145 F. 705 (D. Or. 1906); The F.C. Latrobe, 28 F. 377 (D. Md. 1886); The
Protector, 20 F. 207 (C.C.D. Mass. 1884).
213 179 U.S. 552 (1900).
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the Supreme Court threw into doubt the basis of the immunity of mu-
nicipalities used in the holding of The Fidelity. Workman involved a
ship struck by a New York City fire-boat steaming to reach a warehouse
fire. After first holding that local law did not control a case in admi-
ralty where the local law conflicts with general maritime law,2 14 the
Court went on to declare that where the relation of master and ser-
vant exists between the vessel and the municipality, as in this case,
liability for a maritime tort lies with the city under the rule of respon-
deat superior.215
The Court then noted that a split in the lower courts of admiralty
existed concerning the seizure of public property to satisfy a judg-
ment. Justice White labeled the holding in The Fidelity as "the applica-
tion of the exception as to the mode of execution of a judgment or
decree against such a [municipal] corporation."216 The Supreme
Court stated that while the exception existed, it did not exist in all
maritime cases.217 Moving on to the issue of municipal sovereign im-
munity, White noted a distinction between national immunity and
municipal immunity. National sovereign immunity, both of foreign
governments and of the United States, rested on the inability of the
courts to obtain jurisdiction over the sovereign parties. With munici-
palities, White noted, immunity rested on the choice of a court not to
invoke jurisdiction, although it was within its authority to do so. 2 18
White cited The Siren for the proposition that "the fact that a wrong
has been committed by a public vessel of the [C]rown affords no
ground for contending that no liability arises, because of the public
nature of the vessel."219
Based on this assertion of law, the Court seemed to hold:
[I] n the maritime law, the public nature of the service upon which a
vessel is engaged at the time of commission of a maritime tort af-
fords no immunity from liability in a court of admiralty, where the
court hasjurisdiction. This being so, it follows that as the municipal
corporation of the city of New York, unlike a sovereign, was subject
to the jurisdiction of the court, the claimed exemption from liability
asserted in the case at bar, because of the public nature of the ser-
vice upon which the fire-boat was engaged... was without founda-
tion in the maritime law, and therefore afforded no reason for
214 See id. at 557-64.
215 See id. at 565.
216 Id. (citing Oyster Police Steamers, 31 F. 763, 767-68 (D. Md. 1887) (refusing to
grant sovereign immunity exemption from federal seizure of state-owned vessel)).
217 See id.
218 See id. at 566.
219 Id. at 568.
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denying redress in a court of admiralty for the wrong which the
courts below both found to have been committed.220
I say "seemed" for two reasons. First, the defense asserted by the
city was founded on a theory of emergency, not sovereign immu-
nity,2 2 ' and second, the Court declined to resolve the "contrariety of
opinion 222 regarding seizure of public vessels for maritime torts be-
cause they found that in personam liability applied to the city as own-
ers of the fire-boat. 22 3 So while the main holding of the case was that
local law cannot create an exception to liability found in contrary gen-
eral maritime law, 224 the clear import ofJustice White's opinion was to
repudiate The Fidelity to the extent that it purported to advance an
overweaning theory of municipal immunity in admiralty. 22 5
In any event, White's language can be taken as the Court's con-
tinued endorsement of the twin rules of The Davis and The Siren in
admiralty libels brought against federally claimed property. If either
(1) the government initiated the in rem action, or (2) the res was not
in the actual possession of the government or one of its officers, the
libel may proceed. This was, arguably enough, the prudential rule
that the Court would have advanced in cases of municipal admiralty
liability as well. In a sense, this was the unified rule applicable to all
sovereign immunity defenses in admiralty in rem actions. Neverthe-
less, in 1920, on the eve of the Supreme Court's decisions in In re New
York (Petition of Walsh) and In re New York (The Queen City), the holding
of Bright still governed state immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment.
C. The Revolution Complete: Petition of Walsh and The Queen City
On September 27, 1920, the District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of New York decided a maritime tort case involving two tugboats,
the Henry Koerber, Jr. and the Charlotte, operating on the Erie Ca-
nal.226 Both vessels were under charter by the Superintendent of Pub-
lic Works of the State of New York. Libels were filed in rem.227 The
State Superintendent raised the Eleventh Amendment as a bar to the
court's jurisdiction. The court rejected this defense. In his opinion,
220 Id. at 570.
221 See id. at 572.
222 Id.
223 See id. at 573.
224 See id. at 573-74.
225 But cf. id. at 586-90 (Gray, J., dissenting) (disputing this point).
226 The Henry Koerber, Jr. & The Charlotte, 268 F. 561 (W.D.N.Y. 1920).
227 See id. at 561.
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Judge Hazel of the district court noted that under Workman, only the
federal government possessed sovereign immunity in admiralty
cases.228 The district court also relied heavily on The Davis, as well as
the established rule that the Eleventh Amendment did not apply to
admiralty actions in rem, to hold that
all vessels, regardless of ownership... are amenable to process in
admiralty; the national government alone being exempted,
although a suit at law or in equity where a state must respond is
distinctly a suit against the state ... , yet it is clearly and definitely
recognized in the law that a proceeding in admiralty is sui generis,
and general rules of procedure are treated as inapplicable. 229
Judge Hazel also distinguished Madrazo Iby noting that, unlike in that
case, the district court did properly have jurisdiction over the res, by
virtue of monitions in personam which issued from the court.230
In so holding, the district court denied dismissal of three moni-
tions, one for each libel, issued against the State and delivered to the
Superintendent of Public Works, Edward Walsh. The Attorney Gen-
eral of New York, on behalf of the State and Walsh, filed a petition for
a writ of prohibition231 and mandamus in the U.S. Supreme Court.
What is so surprising about the case is that there appeared to have
been substantial misunderstanding about the nature of the process
that had emanated from the federal district court. Judge Hazel knew
that a libel had been presented before him, and that a writ of arrest
had issued and had been executed upon the Charlotte and the Henry
Koerber, Jr., thus bringing the res within the in rem jurisdiction of his
court.23 2 Yet, in its briefing, New York claimed that "[a] t no time in
these proceedings has any res subjecta belonging to the State of New
York or Mr. Walsh, or in which they claim any interest, been attached
or brought under the jurisdiction of the District Court."2 33
228 See id. at 562.
229 Id. at 563 (also citing The John G. Stevens, 170 U.S. 113, 120 (1898)).
230 See id. (citing In re The Louisville Underwriters, 134 U.S. 488 (1889)).
231 A writ of prohibition was directed from a common law court to a court of
admiralty ordering that a case be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Such a writ was
available under the Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 234, 36 Stat. 1087, 1156 (1911); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 342 (1940) (now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1994)) ("The Supreme
Court shall have power to issue writs of prohibition to the district courts, when pro-
ceeding as courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.").
232 See Return, Brief in Opposition to the Petition at 26, In re State of New York,
256 U.S. 490 (1921) (Orig. No. 26) (Dec. 2, 1920) [hereinafter Judge Hazel's Brie].
233 See Petition for a Writ of Prohibition, Memorandum in Support of Application
at 156, In re State of New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921) (Orig. No. 25) (Oct. 13, 1920)
[hereinafter New York's Brie].
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What seemed to have happened was that the arrests were served
on the tugs after they were no longer under charter to the state. Once
the arrests were made, Judge Hazel then issued the monitions in aid
of his jurisdiction. But New York may well have been correct in sug-
gesting that since the arrests had not been made at a time when the
state was in actual possession of the vessels, the proceeding was one in
personam, and not in rem. And if this was true, New York properly
emphasized that the law seemed settled that an admiralty suit brought
in personam against a state official was barred by the Eleventh Amend-
ment. This was precisely the ruling made by the Supreme Court, Jus-
tice Pitney writing,234 in the Eleventh Amendment analysis which
followed.
The only argument that Pitney really had to address was the pure
textualist point that since the Eleventh Amendment did not mention
admiralty actions, an in personam process issued against a state offi-
cial was not barred. He made short work of this, based on the Court's
reasoning in Hans v. Louisiana,235 which had ruled that even though
the Eleventh Amendment did not mention federal question suits
brought by individuals against their own state, they were still blocked.
"[I] t seems to us equally clear," Justice Pitney wrote, "that it [the Elev-
enth Amendment] cannot with-propriety be construed to leave open a
suit against a State in the admiralty jurisdiction by individuals,
whether its own citizens or not."236 Pitney went on to explain that
Justice Washington's decision in Bright, and the doubts expressed by
Justice Story in his Commentaries, had been laid to rest in Hans,
although he did not explain how. A reader of the Petition of Walsh
opinion was left to conclude that Justices Washington and Story had
simply made the mistake of reading the Eleventh Amendment liter-
ally, an error corrected by the Supreme Court in Hans. In this one
admittedly important respect, Petition of Walsh overruled Bright.2 37
234 In reNew York (Petition of Walsh), 256 U.S. 490, 496 (1921) (Petition of Walsh)
The record shows that the charters had expired according to their terms,
and the tugs were in possession of the claimants [their owners who were not
happy with the damages that the New York tug drivers had inflicted on the
vessels during the charter], neither the State nor Walsh having any claim
upon or interest in them. At no time has any res belonging to the State or to
Walsh, or in which they claim any interest, been attached or brought under
the jurisdiction of the District Court.
Id.
235 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
236 Petition of Walsh, 256 U.S. at 498.
237 See Amar, supra note 69, at 1476; Fletcher, supra note 69, at 1081-82 n.194.
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Justice Pitney then suggested that the Madrazo cases were disposi-
tive, to the extent that they held that an in personain admiralty action
against a state official was not maintainable. He acknowledged, of
course, that neither Madrazo case was an in rem decision since the
federal district court never had possession of the res.23 8 Pitney also
distinguished Workman on the basis of the subject of immunity in that
decision:
[Workman] dealt with a question -of the substantive law of admiralty,
not the power to exercise jurisdiction over the person of defendant;
and in the opinion the court was careful to distinguish between the
immunity from jurisdiction attributable to a sovereign upon
grounds of policy, and immunity from liability in a particular
case.
239
In making this statement he reaffirmed the sovereign immunity en-
joyed by a state in in personam admiralty actions brought by a private
citizen without the state's consent.
Justice Pitney then analyzed whether this was, in fact, a suit
against the State of NewYork and not one against Walsh in an individ-
ual capacity. "[Tihe proceedings.., have no element of a proceed-
ing in rem, and are in the nature of an action in personam against Mr.
Walsh... in his capacity as superintendent of public works .... ,,240
Further, any judgment against Walsh would have to be satisfied out of
state property or out of the state treasury.241 With this finding, the
Court concluded,
In the fullest sense, therefore, the proceedings are shown by the
entire record to be in their nature and effect suits brought by indi-
viduals against the State of New York, and therefore-since no con-
sent has been given-beyond the jurisdiction of the courts of the
United States. 242
Interestingly, this conclusion was based on common law sovereign im-
munity and not specifically on the Eleventh Amendment. This is sup-
ported by Pitney's later statement in the opinion,
It is not inconsistent in principle [that is, uniformity in maritime
law] to accord to the States, which enjoy the prerogatives of sover-
eignty to the extent of being exempt from litigation at the suit of
238 This same point was made in New York's brief. See New York's Brief supra note
233, at 159.
239 Petition of Walsh, 256 U.S. at 499 (citing to Workman v. New York City, 179 U.S.
552, 566 (1900)).
240 Id. at 501.
241 See id. at 502.
242 Id.
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individuals in all other judicial tribunals, a like exemption in the
courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. 243
Petition of Walsh interred (once and for all) any argument, arising
from Justice Washington's opinion in Bright, that the Eleventh
Amendment would not apply to in personam admiralty actions. This
was a welcome development, to the extent that the focus shifted in
Justice Pitney's analysis to the question of whether, in such an in per-
sonam claim, a state officer was impleaded in his official character, or
whether a claim was being made against the state treasury. These
were precisely the concerns raised by the Court in handing down Ex
parte Young,24 4 which permitted injunctive relief against state officials,
acting under color of state law in such a fashion as to derogate federal
rights, including those to disputed property.
But if Petition of Walsh fittingly laid to rest concerns about in per-
sonata actions in admiralty, it served as a curious prelude to the sec-
ond decision that Justice Pitney delivered the same day in The Queen
City.245 As ambiguous as the procedural posture was with the libels
and monitions at issue in Petition of Walsh, the facts of The Queen City
were crystalline: a libel in rem was brought by the estate of a deceased
state employee who worked on the Erie Canal and was killed by the
negligent operation of a state-owned vessel, the Queen City. No
doubt subsisted in the record that the libel was properly filed and the
arrest executed and that the Queen City was, at the time of its arrest,
"employed in the public service of the State for governmental uses
and purposes. 24 6 And although there was some suggestion that it was
improper for the Attorney General of New York to dispute the juris-
diction of the district court by filing a verified suggestion (alleging the
fact that the vessel was used in public service), the Court ruled that
such a suggestion "ought to be accepted as sufficient evidence of the
fact, at least in the absence of special challenge." 247
Once the Court accepted the facts stated in the suggestion made
by the New York Attorney General, the second issue in the case was
243 Id. at 503; see also Walter Landry Smith, Comment, Eleventh Amendment Immunity
and State-Owned Vessels, 57 TUL. L. REv. 1523, 1533-34 (1983).
244 209 U.S. 123 (1908); lawmaking authority, see supra note 13 and accompanying
text.
245 256 U.S. 503 (1921).
246 Id. at 508; see also Brief of Petitioners on Rule to Show Cause at 26-29, The
Queen City, 256 U.S. 503 (1921) (No. 26 Original) (Dec. 1, 1920) (arguing not that
Eleventh Amendment barred suit, but rather, rule of comity prevented the action).
247 The Queen City, 256 U.S. at 509 (distinguishing In re Muir, 254 U.S. 522 (1921)
(holding that such a suggestion of official immunity, when made by a private litigant,
should not be accorded such deference)).
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framed by Justice Pitney as "whether the proceeding can be based
upon the seizure of property owned by a State and used and employed
solely for its governmental uses and purposes."248 Or, put in a slightly
different way, "whether a suit in admiralty brought by private parties
through process in rem against property owned by a State is not in
effect a suit against the State, barred by the general principle applied
in Ex parte New York, No. 1, No. 25, Original."249 Curiously, Justice
Pitney did not invoke the Eleventh Amendment at all. 250 Instead, the
Court's discussion focuses on the "general principle" flowing from var-
ious forms of sovereign immunity, including those enjoyed by foreign
sovereigns251 and municipal corporations:
[I] t is uniformly held in this country that even in the case of munici-
pal corporations, which are not endowed with prerogatives of sover-
eignty to the same extent as the States by which they are created, yet
because they exercise the powers of government for local purposes,
their property and revenue necessary for the exercise of those pow-
ers are to be considered as part of the machinery of government
exempt from seizure and sale under process against the city.25 2
Justice Pitney concluded emphatically,
The principle so uniformly held to exempt the property of munici-
pal corporations employed for public and governmental purposes
from seizure by admiralty process in re, applies with even greater
force to exempt public property of a State used and employed for
public and governmental purposes.2a5
248 Id. at 510.
249 Id.
250 Six months later, the Court held that the prohibition ofjurisdiction found in
Petition of Walsh and The Queen City applied to vessels owned by the United States
either absolutely or pro hac vice. SeeThe Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 434 (1922). This
is further evidence that neither Petition of Walsh nor The Queen City relied upon the
Eleventh Amendment for their holdings. See also The Charlotte, 285 F. 84 (W.D.N.Y.
1922), aff'd, 299 F. 595, 596 (2d Cir. 1924) (per curiam) ('We think it unnecessary to
do more than state our acceptance of the proposition that in the absence of any
diminution of power in this regard by the Constitution of the United States, the state
of New York can neither be sued in personam for the tort complained of, nor can its
property, whether absolute or owned pro hac vice, be made to respond to the same
tort. In other words, the doctrine of Western Maid... applies to and governs this
case.").
251 See The Queen City, 256 U.S. at 510 (citing The Schooner Exchange v. McFad-
den, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812), Moitez v. The South Carolina, 17 F. Cas. 574 (Pa.
Adm. 1781) (No. 9697), The Parlement Belge, 5 P.D. 197, 219-20 (Eng. 1880)).
252 Id. at 511 (citing Klein v. New Orleans, 99 U.S. 149, 150 (1878)).
253 Id. This was, of course, the language from The Fidelity, 8 F. Cas. 1189, 1191
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879) (No. 4758), and from The Davis, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 15, 21 (1869).
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Indeed, Justice Pitney put an even sharper point on the matter: in
order to be immunized by the Eleventh Amendment, the property in
question must be "owned by the state and used and employed solely for
its governmental uses and purposes. '254
The principle of sovereign immunity (rather than an express rul-
ing that the Eleventh Amendment bars in rem actions in admiralty)
was the rule relied upon by the lower courts immediately following
Petition of Walsh and The Queen City.25 5 But what has been overlooked
by many commentators is that the Supreme Court's decisions in 1922
kept intact the earlier jurisprudence arising from The Davis and The
Fidelity. Notice again Justice Pitney's language in The Queen City, limit-
ing the holding to preventing in rem arrests against "public property
of a state used and employed for public and governmental pur-
poses. '256 This was virtually the same idea as invoked in The Davis
(property in the "actual possession" of the state), which the Court did
not cite in The Queen City, and in The Fidelity, to which the Court did
make reference.
In other words, after The Queen City, an in rem action could still
be brought against a res in a federal admiralty court, even if it was
likely that a state would intervene to press a claim against the prop-
erty. Such a case would not be dismissed under the Eleventh Amend-
ment so long as the property in question was not being "used and
employed for public and governmental purposes," or was not in the
actual (and not merely constructive) possession of the state govern-
ment or its officers. Cases coming after The Queen City embraced this
interpretation, and thus denied Eleventh Amendment immunity to
states under these circumstances. 25 7
Moreover, courts were obliged to consider whether state-claimed
property was of a character to invoke Eleventh Amendment immunity
in an in rem admiralty proceeding. The mere appearance of a state in
Cf New York's Brief supra note 233, at 155 (arguing that whether vessel was operated in
a governmental or proprietary capacity was "unimportant").
254 The Queen City, 256 U.S. at 510 (emphasis added).
255 See Intracoastal Transp., Inc. v. Decatur County, Ga., 482 F.2d 361 (5th Cir.
1973) (finding that sovereign immunity granted states through Eleventh Amendment
invokes immunity to in personam claims); The Lisbon, 3 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1925);
The Onteora, 298 F. 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (holding that ferry boat operated by a state
agency is immune to in rem action).
256 The Queen City, 256 U.S. at 510.
257 See The West Point, 71 F. Supp. 206, 207-08, 211 (E.D. Va. 1947) (deciding
that a ferry co-owned by state and municipality and operated for profit and not used
for governmental purposes, is not within scope of Eleventh Amendment immunity).
But cf. United States v. Jardine, 81 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1935) (holding that immunity
applies even if libel seeks to question state's legitimate possession of the vessel).
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making such a claim was insufficient, even though such a suggestion
of immunity "ought to be accepted as sufficient evidence of the fact, at
least in the absence of special challenge." 258 Federal district courts
thus continued to have the competence to decide their own jurisdic-
tion in cases such as these, cases that certainly reflected why certain
characteristic admiralty actions were excluded from the Eleventh
Amendment.
V. TODAY'S ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN ADMIRALTY
A. The Supreme Court Speaks-Sort Of
1. Treasure Salvors Holding
Thus matters stood for the next sixty years or so. The next major
step for Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence in admiralty came with
the enigmatic decision of the Supreme Court in Florida Department of
State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc.25 9 The facts giving rise to that case, while
certainly opaque, were paradigmatic of a new kind of admiralty litiga-
tion involving claims to historic shipwrecks. Treasure Salvors had lo-
cated the wreck of the Spanish galleon, the Nuestra Sefiora de Atocha.
The wreck was located within nine and one-half miles of Florida's
coast, and an in rem arrest was employed to bring the res into the
jurisdiction of the district court. The State of Florida then claimed
ownership to the galleon pursuant to a Florida statute.260 Treasure
Salvors entered into a salvage contract with the state, parts of the gal-
leon and its contents were recovered, and some items were placed in
the custody of the Florida Department of State. When it was later
ruled that the wreck was located too far from Florida's coast to sup-
port the State's claim,26' Treasure Salvors sued the Florida Depart-
ment of State (and its officers) for return of the artifacts. Florida
refused, claiming immunity under the Eleventh Amendment 2 62
In the district court, Judge Mehrten's holding on the Eleventh
Amendment issue was simply that, by instituting a claim for the wreck,
Florida had waived its immunity.2 63 Without citing the case, the dis-
trict court was, in effect, relying on the analogy of The Siren in holding
258 The Queen City, 256 U.S. at 509. This was consistent with the submission made
in Judge Hazel's Brief supra note 232, at 19.
259 458 U.S. 670 (1982).
260 The relevant statute was FLA. STAT. ch. 267.061(1) (b) (1974).
261 See United States v. Florida, 420 U.S. 531 (1975).
262 See Treasure Salvors, 458 U.S. at 673-77.
263 Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel,
459 F. Supp. 507, 521 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
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that where the sovereign itself is initiating the dispute in rem (as in a
prize condemnation proceeding), immunity is waived.2 64 The district
court then focused on Petition of Walsh and The Queen City. ButJudge
Mehrten mischaracterized their holdings as being strictly under the
Eleventh Amendment,265 as opposed to general principles of state sov-
ereign immunity. The district court noted that, unlike The Queen City,
there was a very real doubt whether Florida could make a real claim to
ownership over the Atocha. This was a case, in other words, where
there was reason to entertain a "special challenge" 266 to the State of
Florida's suggestion of immunity.2 67 On this point, Judge Mehrtens
went on to describe the Eleventh Amendment as "a shield to protect
the fiscal integrity of the State. It is not a sword whereby agents of the
State can take and appropriate the property and lives of its citizens
without due process."268
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the holding of the
district court. It upheld the mistaken notion that "the eleventh
amendment applies to admiralty in rem actions," without any discus-
sion, aside from citing Petition of Walsh and The Queen City.2 69 It agreed
with the district court that The Queen City was the controlling law for
this case:
The Queen City tells us that when a state submits uncontroverted
evidence of ownership in an admiralty in rem action, the district
court is bound to accept the assertion and apply the eleventh
amendment accordingly. In the case at bar, however, we have a
controverted claim of ownership. Treasure Salvors offered evidence
and legal arguments to show that it, and not Florida, owned the
artifacts from the Atocha. Such an offer is the "special challenge"
that the Supreme Court envisioned in the Queen City. This chal-
lenge operates to rebut the presumption of validity attributed to a
state's ownership claim.270
The Court of Appeals then held that the district court's finding
that Florida had no ownership interest was correct; therefore, no Elev-
enth Amendment immunity was invoked, since the suit was not one
264 In its analysis of the Eleventh Amendment's effect on the proceedings, the
district court analogized the state's claim to the wreck to one in bankruptcy. Id. at
526 ("The situation is directly analogous to a state filing a claim to a res under the
jurisdiction of the Federal Bankruptcy Court.").
265 See id. at 526-27.
266 The Queen City, 256 U.S. 503, 509 (1921).
267 See Treasure Salvors, 459 F. Supp. at 527.
268 Id. at 528.
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against a state.2 71 Treasure Salvors's "special challenge" obliged the
courts to collapse the jurisdictional inquiry (whether the Eleventh
Amendment applied to the in rem action) into the merits (whether
Florida owned the shipwreck).
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part in a
badly fractured and confused set of opinions.272 Justice Stevens, writ-
ing for a plurality of justices, framed the issue to be answered as
"whether a federal court exercising admiralty in rem jurisdiction may
seize property held by state officials under a claim that the property
belongs to the State."273 In a footnote, Stevens simply stated that the
Supreme Court had previously held the amendment to apply to admi-
ralty actions, citing to Petition of Walsh and The Queen City.2 74 Yet,
rather enigmatically, Stevens wrote,
In ruling that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar execution of
the warrant [of arrest against the artifacts held by the Florida offi-
cials], we need not decide the extent to which a federal district
court exercising admiralty in rem jurisdiction over property before
the court may adjudicate the rights of claimants to that property as
against sovereigns that did not appear and voluntarily assert any
claim that they had to the res.275
This seemed to suggest that the Treasure Salvors Court was not pre-
pared to disturb those earlier decisions holding that the Eleventh
Amendment was not implicated in in rem actions adjudicating title to
property to which the state (or its officers) may have advanced a
claim, but where such property was not being used for a governmental
purpose.276
271 See id. at 1346.
272 See In re Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670 (1982).
The plurality was penned by Justice Stevens (for Chief Justice Burger, and Justices
Marshall and Blackmun). Justice Brennan filed an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part. Justice White filed an opinion also concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part (on behalf also ofJustices Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor).
273 Id. at 683. The key holding in the case concerned the use of the Exparte Young
doctrine, see Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), as an exception to a state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity. See also supra note 13 and accompanying text. Since the
Court found the action to be one against a state official and not one against the State,
the Eleventh Amendment did not bar the action. See Treasure Salvors, 458 U.S. at
691-92. The dissent penned byjustice White in Treasure Salvors would have held that
if Florida had a "colorable claim" to the artifacts, then the suit against the state offi-
cials would have been barred under the Eleventh Amendment. See also supra note 138
and accompanying text.
274 See Treasure Salvors, 458 U.S. at 683 n.17.
275 Id. at 697.
276 See Fletcher, supra note 69, at 1081 n.194.
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In his analysis of Petition of Walsh and The Queen City, Justice Ste-
vens distinguished them from the case before him since Treasure Sal-
vors had merely attempted to arrest the wreck to obtain jurisdiction
and not to assert an ownership interest. Therefore, the present action
was not one in personam to recover damages from the state.277 His
reading of The Queen City was that an in personam action against the
state cannot be turned into an in rem action simply by attaching state
property to the claim. 2 78 He went on to hold, however, that even
though Treasure Salvors's claim against the Florida officials was not
barred by the Eleventh Amendment (because of the Ex parte Young
doctrine which permits injunctive relief against state officials acting
contrary to federal law), the courts below could not determine the
ownership interest of the State of Florida.279
Justice Brennan, concurring in the judgment in part and dissent-
ing in part, took a literal reading of the Eleventh Amendment. In his
separate opinion, he held that the amendment did not apply since the
plain language of the amendment did not extend to suits instituted
against a state by one of its own citizens.2 80 In Brennan's view, the
Hans decision, much like Petition of Walsh and The Queen City, was not
based on a fair textual reading of the Eleventh Amendment. Justice
Brennan would have, therefore, permitted the district court to adjudi-
cate the State's title and interest in the artifacts from the Atocha in an
in rem admiralty proceeding.2 81
Justice Byron White wrote the third opinion in Treasure Salvors,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. His analy-
sis of Petition of Walsh and The Queen City was more literal and protec-
tive of state sovereignty than that provided by Justice Stevens. White
held that the present case was actually one against the State and not a
state official. His conclusion was that
In re New York (I) [Petition of Walsh] indicates that the Eleventh
Amendment will bar a suit that has the effect of proceeding against
a state officer and involving the State's property. In re New York
(II) [The Queen City] squarely stands for the proposition that sover-
eign immunity bars process against a res in the hands of state of-
ficers. This is true even though an in rem action strictly proceeds
against the vessel, and the owner of the vessel or artifacts is not an
indispensable party ....
277 See Treasure Salvors, 458 U.S. at 699-700.
278 See id. at 699.
279 See id. at 700.
280 See id. at 700-01.
281 See id. at 701. Justice Brennan repeated these concerns in his dissent in Atas-
cadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 288 n.41 (1985).
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The In re New York cases [Petition of Walsh and The Queen City]
are particularly forceful because they reflect the special concern in
admiralty that maritime property of the sovereign is not to be
seized. This principle dates back to the English and has not been
significantly altered in this country. The In re New York cases [Peti-
tion of Walsh and The Queen City] are but the most apposite examples
of the line of cases concerning in rem actions brought against ves-
sels in which an official of the State, the Federal Government, or a
foreign government has asserted ownership of the res. The Court's
consistent interpretation of the respective but related immunity
doctrines pertaining to such vessels has been, upon proper presen-
tation that the sovereign entity claims ownership of a res in its pos-
session, to dismiss the suit or modify the judgment accordingly.28 2
2. Treasure Salvors's Anti-Historicism
This is a significant passage, and it may be telling that Justice
White had the better part of the argument in his characterization of
Petition of Walsh and The Queen City. But there were a number of flaws
in Justice White's observations, and although these went undetected
in the plurality, they need to be pointed out here. The first is an
historical mistake. As has been suggested already, it is by no means
clear that there ever was a doctrine of immunity from in rem actions
for property owned, or claimed, by the sovereign.283 The research
presented here is that, at the time of the Revolution (in both England
and in the colonies), such a doctrine would have been doubted. It
only grew in prominence through a series of decisions, beginning with
the immunities of foreign sovereign vessels, and then assimilating to
vessels and property owned and operated by the federal sovereign
(the United States and the British Crown), and only circumstantially
being applied to states and municipalities. 284
The second misstep Justice White made in his analysis was to ig-
nore the consistent language of the precedents that he relied upon
for his "historical" basis for sovereign immunity in admiralty. Chief
among these was The Siren, The Davis, and the crucial, limiting lan-
guage of The Queen City itself (the locus classicus for applying the Elev-
enth Amendment bar to in rem actions). Justice White asserted that
"maritime property of the sovereign is not to be seized" via in rem
process and that immunity attaches at the moment the relevant sover-
282 Treasure Salvors, 458 U.S. at 709-10 (citations omitted) (White, J., concurring
and dissenting).
283 See supra Part IA.
284 See supra Part IVA.-B.
1997]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
eign "has asserted ownership of the res."285 Yet, what each of those
three cases indicated was that, in certain situations, an in rem claim
could be used to adjudicate title and possession over property in
which a state had a claim. These circumstances included where the
sovereign itself initiated the action (as in prize or in forfeiture) 286 or
where the res subject to the arrest was not in the "actual possession" of
the state2 8 7 or was not being used for "public and governmental pur-
poses."288 Justice White's opinion did not appreciate those situations
in which in rem claims cannot be said to implicate state sovereignty,
although he did mention the condition that the "res [must be] in the
hands of state officers" 289 in order for the Eleventh Amendment to be
triggered.
Lastly, by confounding principles of foreign sovereign immunity,
the sovereign immunity of the United States, and the Eleventh
Amendment immunity enjoyed by states in federal courts, White per-
petuated a mixing of doctrinal metaphors that has caused substantial
mischief. In fairness, Justice White was following the lead of the Peti-
tion of Walsh and The Queen City which had relied upon all of these
sources of sovereign immunity to fashion a new doctrine for states,
despite nearly 120 years of precedent to the contrary. Nevertheless, by
not analytically distinguishing the underlying purposes and principles
of these manifestations of immunity from admiralty jurisdiction, the
natural result was to grant a privilege to states (immunity from admi-
ralty in rem actions) that they had not hitherto enjoyed.
3. Welch
In large measure, then, the Treasure Salvors opinion marked the
battle lines of the doctrinal debate for the Eleventh Amendment in
many different contexts for the years to follow. Yet, despite that, only
once since that decision has the Court returned to the problem of
admiralty and the Eleventh Amendment. That was in Welch v. Texas
Department of Highways & Public Transportation,290 which involved a
dock worker for a public ferry injured in an accident on the job who
sued under the federal Jones Act.291 In yet another plurality opinion
(this time authored by Justice Powell), the Court affirmed the dismis-
285 Treasure Salvors, 458 U.S. at 709-10 (White, J., concurring and dissenting).
286 This is the rule of The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 154-55 (1868).
287 See The Davis, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 15, 21 (1869).
288 See The Queen City, 256 U.S. 503, 510 (1921).
289 Treasure Salvors, 458 U.S. at 709 (White, J., concurring and dissenting).
290 483 U.S. 468 (1987).
291 See 46 U.S.C. § 688 (Supp. 1996).
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sal of the action on Eleventh Amendment grounds.292 As to admiralty
actions brought by a private citizen against a state,Justice Powell again
upheld the jurisdictional bar of the Amendment, citing Petition of
Walsh, The Queen City, and Treasure Salvors for the proposition that the
Eleventh Amendment prohibited a private citizen from bringing an in
rem action against a vessel owned by a state.293 This was, of course,
dicta, since Welch's suit (under the Jones Act) was in personam.294
The plurality carefully avoided deciding the issue whether Congress,
in adopting the Jones Act pursuant to its power under the Admiralty
Clause, had abrogated the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity.295
The underlying assumption for this proposition (that Congress had
this power) was, in any event, ultimately rejected by the Supreme
Court in 1996 in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,296 holding that Congress
could only abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant
to the Fourteenth Amendment.
It was Justice Brennan's dissent in Weh (joined by Justices Mar-
shall, Blackmun, and Stevens) which, for the first time, attempted to
reach an historical understanding of the Eleventh Amendment and
admiralty. Beginning with the supposition that the inapplicability of
the Eleventh Amendment to admiralty matters was settled in Bright,29 7
Brennan proceeded to analyze how the Court later (in Petition of Walsh
and The Queen City) began to stray. Justice Brennan was insistent that,
to the extent the Eleventh Amendment did not textually include ad-
miralty actions within its ambit, acts of Congress should be liberally
construed to abrogate the states' immunity from suit in federal court,
292 Justice Powell ran through the history of the Eleventh Amendment to find that
there was no cause to overrule Hans or to rule that private citizens could bring a
federal question action against a state. See Welch, 483 U.S. at 480-88.
293 See id. at 473 & n.3.
294 Powell acknowledged it as such. See id. at 490.
295 See id. at 476 n.5; see also Ristow v. South Carolina Ports Auth., 58 F.3d 1051
(4th Cir. 1995); Daniel J. Cloherty, Comment, Exclusive Jurisdiction and the Eleventh
Amendment: Recognizing the Assumption of State Court Availability in the Clear Statement
Compromise, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1287, 1318-19 (1994).
296 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
297 See Welch, 483 U.S. at 499 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting JOHN V. ORmH,
THEJUDICAL POWER OF THE UNrrED STATES 37 (1987) ("Although the Supreme Court
did not pass on the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment in admiralty until more
than a century later, it was assumed by bench and bar in the meantime that Bright was
correctly reasoned.")).
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especially when individuals are suing under federal statutory schemes
pursuant to the Commerce and Admiralty Clauses. 298
In response to Brennan's historical evidence, Justice Powell was
reduced to nitpicking. He asserted that the rule of Bright was actually
a jury charge to a federal circuit court, that it was not a real holding,
and that the Supreme Court never had an opportunity to review the
decision. 299 Moreover, Powell read the ambiguous opinions in the
Madrazo cases as suggesting that "the early cases in fact indicate that
unconsenting States were immune from suits in admiralty. At the very
least, they demonstrate that the dissent errs in suggesting that the
amenability of States to suits in admiralty was 'settled."'300
In a sense, of course, both Justices Powell and Brennan were
wrong in their respective historical treatments in Welch. To the extent
that Brennan argued (as he was required to) that the Eleventh
Amendment did not apply to in personam admiralty actions, his only
support was the textual silence of the Eleventh Amendment and Jus-
tice Washington's opinion in Bright. Not even Justice Story, in his
Commentaries, seemed to unreservedly support such a view.30' On the
other hand, Justice Powell seems to have erred in ignoring the strong
evidence that in rem actions were treated differently, not only as a
matter of admiralty procedure, but also because of concerns for uni-
formity and national control over sensitive subject matters often impli-
cated in such in rem proceedings.
B. Later Shipwreck Cases
1. History and Fiction
It was thus only a matter of time before additional cases implicat-
ing the states' immunities in in rem cases were bound to appear. As in
Treasure Salvors, disputes as to ownership of historic shipwrecks pro-
vided the context. The procedural posture of almost all of the ship-
wreck cases that followed Treasure Salvors was remarkably consistent.
In virtually every case, an individual salvor or salvage company had
identified the location of a lost shipwreck. Each of the shipwrecks,
unlike the Atocha in Treasure Salvors, was located on state submerged
lands (usually within three to nine nautical miles from shore). 302
298 See id. at 502-03; see also Clark, supra note 39, at 1332-60; William A. Fletcher,
The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine
Insurance, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1513 (1984); Fletcher, supra note 69, at 1082.
299 See Welch, 483 U.S. at 491 n.23.
300 Id. at 493 (citation omitted).
301 See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
302 See United States v. Florida, 420 U.S. 531, 532-33 (1975).
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That location is what gave rise, in each case, to a state's claim that it
(and not the finder or salvor of the property) was the owner. States
invariably raised their claims in response to in rem libels filed by the
finders or salvors of the property. And, at the same time, states chal-
lenged the jurisdiction of the federal courts in hearing these libels, on
the theory that if they did so, such an adjudication would violate their
Eleventh Amendment immunities.
This precise problem had been left open by Treasure Salvors, and
courts considering the question reached very different conclusions.
Those decisions rejecting states' Eleventh Amendment immunity
tended, of course, to followJustice Stevens's narrow plurality decision.
In Cobb Coin Co. v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel,303
Judge King on the district court held that a mere declaration of own-
ership by the State did not invoke the jurisdictional bar of the Elev-
enth Amendment.3 0 4 In the same passage, he added that only such
public property that is actually possessed by the state or "employed for
governmental purposes" is exempt from seizure under the The Queen
City holding.305 Judge King specifically indicated that the Treasure Sal-
vors opinions (including Justice White's dissent) were to be read con-
sistently with the limiting language of The Queen City, which was, in
turn, drawn from The Fidelity and The Davis.30 6
A less satisfying approach in denying a state's Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity was taken in The Sindia Expedition, Inc. v. The Sindia.30 7
There, the Third Circuit held that not all in rem actions involving a
shipwreck which may be claimed as state property are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment.
We hold that under the law of Treasure Salvors the Expedition's
admiralty complaint in rem is not barred by the Eleventh Amend-
ment. Here, the Expedition has claimed an ownership interest in
the vessel under the law of finds and also seeks to enforce a lien
against the ship under the laws of maritime salvage. Therefore, the
action is a genuine admiralty in rem action against the vessel and
not a circuitous in personam action to obtain jurisdiction over the
State for purposes of money damages.3 0 8
Relying onJustice Stevens's plurality in Treasure Salvors, the Third Cir-
cuit felt comfortable in ruling that because the libel against the ship-
wreck did not specifically name the state or a state agency as a party,
303 549 F. Supp. 540 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
304 See id. at 551 n.10.
305 Id.
306 See id.
307 895 F.2d 116 (3d Cir. 1990).
308 Id. at 120 (footnotes omitted).
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the proceeding was not one against a state for the purposes of the
Eleventh Amendment. Furthermore, the Third Circuit noted that a
district court need not determine the interests of the state in the
wreck; the court's judgment in rem could act against the entire world
save for the state.30 9
This fictional logic used in saving in rem actions from the Elev-
enth Amendment bar to jurisdiction (as distinct from an historical
approach which explains the doctrinal exceptions) was bound to be
savaged by other courts. The First Circuit noted in Maritime Underwa-
ter Surveys, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing VesseP 10
that "the Court has never defined the precise contours of the Eleventh
Amendment bar to admiralty jurisdiction," but held that where antiq-
uities were lodged in the seabed within the territorial boundaries of a
state, the Eleventh Amendment did serve to bar the jurisdiction of the
court to determine title to that property, absent the state's consent.311
Moreover, the Maritime court held that the mere claim by a state to
such title, "regardless of the[ ] merit" of the claim,31 2 ousted the juris-
diction of the district court under the Eleventh Amendment.
Taking an analogous position, a district court decision relied on
Petition of Walsh, The Queen City, and Treasure Salvors to find that the
Eleventh Amendment barred a claim to antiquities brought up from
the seabed where the state had "colorable claim" to title over the
property and the state had not consented to a determination of its
interest in the property.3 13 Yet, such a "colorable claim" could be sat-
isfied simply by virtue of state legislation making a bald assertion of
title to property situated on submerged lands, irrespective of whether
the property was actually possessed by the state or its officers.
3 1 4
309 See id. at 121. The Third Circuit also held that the State of NewJersey was not
an indispensible party to the litigation. See id. at 121-23.
310 717 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1983).
311 Id. at 8.
312 Id.
313 Subaqueous Exploration & Archaeology, Ltd. v. Unidentified, Wrecked &
Abandoned Vessel, 577 F. Supp. 597, 605 (D. Md. 1983); see also Riebe v. Unidentified,
Wrecked & Abandoned 18th Century Shipwreck, 691 F. Supp. 923, 926-27 (E.D.N.C.
1987). For a case where a state had waived its (purported) immunity for a federal
court to adjudicate title in a shipwreck subject to an in rem libel, see Chance v. Certain
Artifacts Found & Salvaged from The Nashville, 606 F. Supp. 801, 803-04 (S.D. Ga. 1984),
affd, 775 F.2d 302 (11th Cir. 1985).
314 See Subaqueous Exploration, 577 F. Supp. at 608 (citing Md. Nat. Res. Code Ann.
§ 2-309 (1982)); see also Marx v. Guam, 866 F.2d 294, 301 (9th Cir. 1989); Jupiter
Wreck, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 691 F. Supp. 1377,
1383-84 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
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2. Congress and Colorability
a. The Abandoned Shipwreck Act
In 1987, however, a literal sea change occurred in the character
of shipwreck litigation and the application of the Eleventh Amend-
ment in these cases. This was precipitated by the adoption of the
Abandoned Shipwreck Act (ASA) by Congress in that year.315 The
stated purpose of the Act was to "vest title to certain abandoned his-
toric shipwrecks that are buried in State lands to the respective
States."316 Congress estimated that there were as many as 50,000
abandoned shipwrecks located in the navigable waters of the United
States, potentially under state jurisdiction. 317 While the ASA did not
identify what made a vessel "abandoned," it did partially identify an
"abandoned shipwreck" as being one "embedded in submerged lands
of a State."318
To accomplish the goal of transferring title over abandoned ship-
wrecks to the states, Congress employed a two step process in the ASA.
First, the United States asserted title to all abandoned shipwrecks com-
ing within the ambit of the Act-319 Next, the United States transferred
that title "to the State in or on whose submerged lands the shipwreck
is located."320 Congress also decided that "the law of salvage and the
law of finds shall not apply to abandoned shipwrecks" for which the
Act had transferred title to the states.321 This meant two things. First,
the ASA would be construed as overruling the admiralty's common
law of finds which would have, absent a statute, vested title in the
finder of an abandoned shipwreck. 322 Second, the states were free to
315 See Pub. L. No. 100-298 (Apr. 28, 1988) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2106
(Supp. 1996)).
316 H.R. REP. Nos. 100-514(I) & 100-514(11) (1987), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.CA.N.
365, 365, 370.
317 See id. at 365.
318 ASA § 6(a) (1), 43 U.S.C. § 2105(a) (1) (Supp. 1996).
319 See id.
320 Id. § 6(c), 43 U.S.C. §2105(c).
321 Id. § 7(a), 43 U.S.C. §2106(a).
322 For more on the differences between the law of finds and salvage, see Colum-
bus-America Discovery Group v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 450 (4th Cir. 1992);
Hener v. United States, 525 F. Supp. 350, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Patty Gerstenblith,
Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of Cultural Property in the United States, 73
B.U. L. REV. 559, 601-22 (1995); Douglas S. Cohen, Note, Should Noli Forfendi Apply to
Sunken Ships?, 73 B.U. L. REv. 193 (1993).
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adopt legislation which could bar or sharply curtail an individual's
right to a salvage award for locating an abandoned shipwreck. 323
The many possible constitutional defects of the Abandoned Ship-
wreck Act were fully explicated in two cases brought by Harry Zych in
federal district court in Illinois, one involving the wreck of the Lady
Elgin, the other the Seabird.324 Although the cases began as a consoli-
dated action, they were split off for a fundamental reason: Zych had
conceded that the Seabird was abandoned, while the question of con-
tinued ownership of the Lady Elgin was still very much an issue.
b. The Lady Elgin
In The Lady Elgin, the federal district court granted an injunction,
good against the entire world, to protect Zych's salvage rights in the
vessel. Illinois appealed, claiming that the district court lacked juris-
diction even to issue an injunction in such a case, and the Seventh
Circuit agreed. 325 The Seventh Circuit, Judge Easterbrook writing,
held that the mere assertion of a claim by a state triggered the Elev-
enth Amendment. "[I] t is the existence, and not the strength, of the
claim that activates the eleventh amendment," he wrote.3 26
This elevated the "colorable claim" standard, enunciated by the
dissent in Treasure Salvors,327 to unimagined heights. Taken literally,
the simple interposition of a claim to a property under libel in the
federal district court would oust the court's jurisdiction. Indeed,
Judge Easterbrook may have been suggesting that the court may be
without power to test the colorability or strength of the state's claim to
the res, without running afoul of the Eleventh Amendment.328 This
extremist result was specifically rejected by a number of other
323 See H.R. REP. Nos. 100-514(I) & 100-514(11) (1987), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.CA.N. 365, 371.
324 The writer discloses that he served as counsel to Harry Zych in both these pro-
ceedings. For more on this extraordinary litigation, see Gerstenblith, supra note 322,
at 612-17; Peter A. McLauchlan et al., Recent Developments in Maritime Law, 18 TUL.
MAR. L.J. 259, 313 (1994); Peter Tomlinson, Comment, "Full Fathom Five": Legal Hur-
dies to Treasure, 42 EMORY L.J. 1099 (1993).
325 See Zych v. The Lady Elgin, 960 F.2d 665 (7th Cir. 1992), vacating, No. 89-
C6501, 1991 WL 34714 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 1991).
326 Id. at 670. For a criticism of this, see Tomlinson, supra note 324, at 1134-35.
327 See supra note 273.
328 Cf the lower court opinion in the case, Zych v. The Seabird, 746 F. Supp. 1334,
1338-41 (N.D. ll. 1990) (applyingJustice Stevens's three-pronged test in Treasure Sal-
vors). Judge Rovner indicated that "[elngaging in this preliminary inquiry does not
cross the line into an impermissible determination of the merits of the state's claim."
Id. at 1341 n.8.
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courts, 3 29 which held that a federal court has the jurisdiction to deter-
mine whether the factual predicates of the Abandoned Shipwreck Act
are satisfied,33 0 and thus whether the state has a colorable claim to the
wreck.
c. The Seabird
In 1989, Harry Zych discovered the wreck of the Seabird and filed
an in rem admiralty action in federal district court seeking a declara-
tion of ownership in the vessel or, in the alternative, a liberal salvage
award from its true owner. The Illinois Department of Transportation
and the Illinois Historic Preservation Agency intervened on behalf of
the State of Illinois, asserting title to the remains of the Seabird, pur-
suant to the ASA, and also claiming that the Eleventh Amendment
barred Zych's salvage action. Zych countered by submitting that the
Act was unconstitutional to the extent that it purported to divest him
of title or to deny his salvage award. The United States then inter-
vened to defend the ASA's constitutionality.
Upon its first review of the case, the district court conditioned its
analysis on whether any litigation of Illinois's interest in the Seabird
was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. If Illinois had a colorable
claim to the wreck, the district court, reasoning from Treasure Sal-
vors,33 1 concluded that to the extent Zych sought relief from the State
of Illinois, his suit would be barred.33 2 The only possible basis for
Illinois's claim to the Seabird was the ASA, and so Judge Rovner pro-
ceeded to consider Zych's constitutional challenges to that statute,
which she rejected.333
329 See Deep Sea Research, Inc. v. The Brother Jonathan, 102 F.3d 379 (9th Cir.
1996) (in which the author served as counsel for the libellant); Fairport Int'l Explora-
tion, Inc. v. The Captain Lawrence, 913 F. Supp. 552, 554 (W.D. Mich. 1995), affd,
105 F.3d 1078, 1083-84 (6th Cir. 1997); see also Robert Miller, Note, Charting theFuture
of Historic Shipwreck Legislation in California: Application of the English Model in the Salvage
of the Brother Jonathan, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 793 (1994).
330 These include showing that the wreck is (1) abandoned, and either (2) embed-
ded or (3) listed (or found eligible for listing) on the Registry of National Historic
Places. SeeASA, 43 U.S.C. § 2105(a) (1994).
331 See Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 690 (1982).
332 See Zych v. The Seabird, 746 F. Supp. 1334, 1338-41 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
333 Drawing on the Supreme Court's admiralty clause jurisprudence, particularly
Panama RR. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 386-87 (1924), the district court noted that
the ASA would be unconstitutional if the statute excluded from the federal court's
jurisdiction a subject matter traditionally reserved to admiralty, or if it rendered the
substantive maritime law non-uniform throughout the United States. Judge Rovner
held that the ASA did neither. See Zych v. The Seabird, 746 F. Supp. 1334, 1344-49
(N.D. ill. 1990). The district court therefore dismissed any claims against Illinois.
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The court of appeals reversed in Zych v. The Seabird (The Seabird 1).
Departing significantly from Judge Rovner's analysis, the Seventh Cir-
cuit focused exclusively on the ASA.334 But the court of appeals found
that a ruling on the ASA's constitutionality was premature; there had
been no finding that the Seabird was actually embedded in Illinois's
submerged lands. Absent such a finding,335 the ASA was apparently
not even implicated.336 Back on remand, the district court decided
that as to Zych's salvage claims, if title in the Seabird was held by Illi-
nois, any salvage claim against the state necessarily was barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. And, if the Eleventh Amendment barred sal-
vage actions against states, then the ASA could not be found to imper-
missibly remove such cases from federal court jurisdiction.33 7
Impressed with Judge Rovner's reasoning on the matter, Zych re-
canted on appeal any interest in seeking title in the Seabird as against
Illinois. By conceding that the wreck was owned by the state, Zych
submitted that the ASA nonetheless was unconstitutional by impermis-
sibly excluding salvage claims from federal court jurisdiction or by
making the substantive admiralty law of salvage non-uniform. The
Seventh Circuit held that the ASA did not unconstitutionally exclude
salvage claims against states over abandoned shipwrecks from federal
334 See Zych v. The Seabird, 941 F.2d 525, 528 (7th Cir. 1991) (The Seabird 1).
335 On remand to the district court, Zych stipulated that the Seabird was embed-
ded in the submerged lands of Illinois, thus proffering the factual predicate for a
constitutional review of the ASA, which Judge Rovner proceeded to supply. See Zych
v. The Seabird, 811 F. Supp. 1300, 1305 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
336 Although the issue of the ASA's constitutionality was deferred, the court of
appeals nonetheless opined on the two-pronged Panama R. test earlier elaborated
by Judge Rovner. The Seventh Circuit, in what appeared to be entirely dicta, see The
Seabird I, 941 F.2d at 534, checked both the ASA's effect on traditional admiralty juris-
diction and on the uniformity of substantive maritime law. See id. at 530-31. The
court of appeals sensibly observed that the issue whether the ASA excluded a substan-
tial class of traditional admiralty causes from federal jurisdiction was "a close one," id.
at 531, and left that for further briefing and deliberation before the district court.
But on the matter of substantive uniformity, the Seventh Circuit decided that
"[i]f the ASA passes the first constitutional hurdle [of not impermissibly excluding a
class of traditional cases from admiralty jurisdiction], then it passes constitutional
muster, for it does not violate the second requirement that admiralty law foster uni-
formity." Id. at 532. In collapsing the two prongs of Panama RR., the court of appeals
noted that "[i]f the ASA permissibly takes embedded shipwrecks entirely out of the
realm of federal admiralty jurisdiction, the uniformity principle has not been vio-
lated." Id. at 533.
I discuss this misstep in DavidJ. Bederman, Uniformity, Delegation and the Dormant
Admiralty Clause, 28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 1, 29-32 (1997).
337 See Zych v. The Seabird, 811 F. Supp. 1300, 1309-13 (N.D. ill. 1992).
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court jurisdiction because such claims were never within that jurisdic-
tion by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment.338
The court of appeals, in Zych v. The Seabird (The Seabird I1), re-
jected Zych's submission that in rem salvage claims against sovereigns
were allowed by the Eleventh Amendment.3 39 Also, the Seventh Cir-
cuit took pains to differentiate between federal sovereign immunity
and state immunity under the Constitution. Zych had argued that the
Eleventh Amendment bar to in rem admiralty actions implicating
state claims to property had to be understood in view of the Supreme
Court's earlier decisions, most notably in The Davis. The Seventh Cir-
cuit declined to apply what it regarded only as an "analogy,"340 this
exception to Eleventh Amendment state immunity:
[S]tate sovereign immunity is categorically different from federal
sovereign immunity. Federal sovereign immunity is a common law
doctrine that simply holds that the federal government cannot be
sued without its consent. State sovereign immunity is a constitutional
doctrine which rests on principles of federalism. As in The Davis, it
is one thing for a federal court to order the federal government-of
which the federal court is part-to do something. It is quite an-
other for a federal court to order a state-a separate sovereign-to
pay something, like a salvage award, without the state's consent....
The exception to the common law doctrine of federal sover-
eign immunity alluded to in The Davis does not apply to the state
sovereign immunity established by the Eleventh Amendment.34'
The irony of this passage should not be lost on those who have
read this far. Doctrines of federal sovereign immunity and foreign
sovereign immunity were what drove the transformation of the Elev-
enth Amendment's application in admiralty. Before the turn to an
extremist position in sovereign immunity in the mid to late nine-
teenth century, it seemed well settled that the states did not enjoy
Eleventh Amendment immunity in in rem actions. It was understood,
certainly in such cases as Bright, that the Eleventh Amendment should
be read as only applying to such cases as the plain language of the
provision mentioned.
By the turn of this century, the Supreme Court applied the com-
mon law doctrine of sovereign immunity to the admiralty cases against
states to bar federal court jurisdiction of in rem, as well as in per-
sonam claims. It was manifest in the decisions following the Petition of
Walsh and The Queen City opinions that the common law doctrine was
338 See Zych v. The Seabird, 19 F.3d 1136 (7th Cir. 1994) (The Seabird 11).
339 See id. at 1141-42.
340 Id. at 1142.
341 Id. (citations omitted).
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the basis of the extension of the Eleventh Amendment to in rem ac-
tions. But The Queen City was scrupulous in retaining the common law
exceptions subsisting with the grant of immunity. At a minimum,
these included situations where the sovereign was itself initiating the
proceedings and where the res was not in the actual possession of the
state nor being used for a governmental purpose.
The opinion in The Seabird II indicates the extent to which the
historic evolution of states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in admi-
ralty has been forgotten. The Seventh Circuit seemed to assume that
the Eleventh Amendment bar to in rem actions predated the related
doctrine (with its exceptions) in federal sovereign immunity. Not so.
When Eleventh Amendmentjurisprudence incorporated those princi-
ples of federal sovereign immunity, it took not only the rule (that,
after The Queen City, the Eleventh Amendment would apply to in rem
admiralty actions), but also the exceptions to the rule (derived from
The Siren, The Davis, and The Fidelity). Unlike Judge King's opinion in
Cobb Coin,342 which correctly traced the evolution of the doctrine, the
Seventh Circuit simply erased much of this history.
VI. RETURNING TO AN ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING
OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN ADMIRALTY
Of all the possible constructions of the Eleventh Amendment,
which, then, is best reconciled with the Adopters' views of state sover-
eign immunity in cases implicating the federal admiralty jurisdiction?
To answer this, it would be wise to review the range of doctrinal pos-
sibilities. Here are the choices: (1) The Eleventh Amendment is inap-
plicable to admiralty actions involving states as parties or claimants,
whether initiated in personam or in rem; (2) the Amendment bars in
personam claims, but permits all in rem libels, even those to which a
state interposes a claim; (3) the Amendment proscribes all in rem li-
bels involving state-claimed property, except for those falling within
the common law exceptions of sovereign immunity detailed in The
Siren, The Davis, The Fidelity, and The Queen City (that is, where the state
initiates the proceeding, or where the state is not in actual possession
of the res or if the res is not in the governmental service of the state);
(4) the Amendment bars all in rem claims, except for prize libels; and
(5) the Amendment bars a federal court from hearing any in rem libel
after a state enters a claim to the res.
Let me consider the more extreme options first. I believe it
would be extravagant to maintain that the Eleventh Amendment per-
342 See Cobb Coin Co. v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 549
F. Supp. 540, 551 n.10 (S.D. Fla 1982).
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mits an in personam admiralty action against a state without its con-
sentfr 43 Much of this Article has, of course, considered the textual
implication of the omission of admiralty actions in the Eleventh
Amendment. And while I have concluded that the omission was pur-
poseful, 44 I can find no authority for the proposition that it was in-
tended to allow all suits against states to proceed under both in
personam and in rem mechanisms.
The only support for such a conclusion would have to be based
on the interplay of state sovereign immunity and exclusive federal
court jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime matters under Article
III of the Constitution. If such a grant had, in fact, been exclusive,
then I might believe that under Hamilton's and Randolph's notion of
the "plan of the convention"345 there had been a "surrender" of state
sovereignty in two senses: the loss of state court jurisdiction over all
admiralty and maritime matters and also the concomitant relinquish-
ment of state sovereign immunity in such cases. But, as we know from
the "savings to suitors" clause of the Judiciary Act of 1789,346 federal
court jurisdiction was not exclusive in all cases. There was a class of
cases involving common law remedies where state and federal courts
had concurrent jurisdiction. These common law remedies in state
court would have, in all cases, been initiated by in personam process.
I conclude, therefore, that the Adopters, despite the textual lacu-
nae regarding admiralty, would not likely have contemplated in per-
sonam proceedings against states in admiralty. I regard as error
Justice Washington's categorical view in Bright,347 even though it was
supported by at least some of the publicists of his day.3 48 Nor does the
opinion by the four dissenting Justices in Welch349 persuade. It ap-
pears that much of that opinion depended on the idea that, irrespec-
tive of whether the Eleventh Amendment covered admiralty in
personam actions, Congress was always free to abrogate state sover-
eign immunity pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers. That idea
has certainly been repudiated by Seminole, and Justice Brennan's fol-
343 My only doubt would be in the rather far-fetched event that Congress, pursu-
ant to its Fourteenth Amendment power, and under the Court's decision in Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996), abrogates the state's Eleventh Amendment
immunity by providing a statutory remedy arising in admiralty.
344 See supra Part II.B.
345 See supra Part I.B-C.
346 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
347 See United States v. Bright, 24 F. Cas. 1232, 1236 (C.C.D. Pa. 1809) (No.
14,647).
348 See DUPONCEAU, supra note 124, at 38.
349 See supra Part V.A.3.
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lowers3 5 0 in the Welch dissent may not have been so enthusiastic in
suggesting that the Eleventh Amendment bar (on its own terms) does
not extend to in personam admiralty actions.
That brings up the equal but opposite doctrinal position: that
states are immune from all admiralty actions, even those initiated in
rem, where the state enters a bare claim to the disputed res. Not sur-
prisingly, I regard this position as radical and extreme, one repudi-
ated even during the heyday of sovereign immunity in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Despite the resurrection of
this idea by the First and Seventh Circuit's decisions in some of the
shipwreck cases,351 I do not believe this doctrine can be seriously en-
tertained in its most literal form. The language of Judge Campbell in
Maritime and Judge Easterbrook in The Lady Elgin seemed to empha-
size that the colorability, much less the relative strength, of the state's
claim to a disputed res was irrelevant. All that mattered was that the
state had made the claim.
If taken literally, this position embraces the heresy that a federal
court is powerless to decide its own jurisdiction. I do believe that
there may be some merit to the idea that the Eleventh Amendment
protects the dignitary interest of states in avoiding being haled into
federal court,3 52 just as much as it insulates states from the coercive
powers of the federal courts. To accept such a view is not, however,
the same as believing that a state, by simply interposing itself in an
admiralty in rem action, automatically divests the federal court of its
otherwise constitutionally allocated jurisdiction under Article III.
There must be some test applied to weigh the colorability of the
state's claim, some determination to be made regarding whether the
extent of the state's interests are such as to implicate the Eleventh
Amendment immunity from litigation in federal court. And it must
be the federal court itself that makes that evaluation of its own juris-
diction. A state simply cannot arrogate that power.
Quite apart from whether the common law of federal sovereign
immunity might provide such a standard for generally distinguishing
weak from strong claims of state interest (which I will consider pres-
ently), it might be that there is a continued role for Congress to pre-
scribe what is (and what is not) a colorable claim in admiralty for
350 On the other hand, Justice Brennan himself made clear in his Treasure Salvors
and Atascadero opinions that he did believe that the Eleventh Amendment simply did
not apply to any admiralty action. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
351 See supra Part V.B.
352 See Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139,
146 (1993); Employees v. Missouri Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 294
(1973) (Marshall, J., concurring).
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purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. Consider again the Aban-
doned Shipwreck Act. In no event should it be construed as a Con-
gressional abrogation of states' Eleventh Amendment immunity, even if
the Supreme Court had not ruled in Seminole that such abrogation
could only occur pursuant to Congress's powers under the Fourteenth
Amendment. What the ASA does, though, is define those conditions
under which a state will have valid title to shipwrecks located on its
submerged lands.35 3 I would suggest that this should also be consid-
ered the standard for colorability.
States might, of course, object that they are being made to prove
their title in order to win their immunity from suit. The dignitary
interest implicated in the Eleventh Amendment demands, moreover,
that a state's immunity from suit in federal court be protected even if
it seems that the state's claim lacks merit. And while there is some
logical appeal to this submission, it usually evaporates when a state
pushes its point too far: that it should not be required to prove any-
thing to have the in rem libel dismissed on Eleventh Amendment
grounds. The best approach, it would seem to me, would be one in
which a subset of the elements used to establish title for a disputed res
would be employed to determine if the state's claim is colorable for
purposes of dismissing the libel. So if the ASA requires abandonment
and embeddedness to establish title, it would make sense for a federal
court to require that a state, at a minimum, show that the relevant
shipwreck is abandoned in order to have the case dismissed under the
Eleventh Amendment. If a state cannot make such a showing, it can-
not prove the most basic element of its claim, and it therefore lacks
colorability. The state's interposition of a claim in such circumstances
would lack credibility and the vital connection to a state interest which
the Eleventh Amendment was intended to serve in our federal system.
The extreme positions aside, I think the Adopters of the Eleventh
Amendment believed that at least some sorts of in rem suits could be
maintained in federal court, even in the face of claims made by states.
Taking the easiest such proof first, I do not harbor any doubts whatso-
ever that the Adopters had no intention of permitting a state to claim
Eleventh Amendment immunity in in rem prize proceedings. These
cases had been a continuous source of friction in state-federal rela-
tions in the Articles of Confederation period. Remember, concurrent
state and federal prize courts had issued the disputed rulings that fea-
353 Specifically, the wreck must be abandoned and either embedded in the seabed
or found eligible for listing on the National Register of Historic Places. See ASA, 43
U.S.C. § 2105(a) (1994).
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tred so prominently in Pennhallow v. Doane's Administrators3 54 and
United States v. Peters.355
There is not a doubt that the Framers of the Constitution desired
to vest in the federal courts exclusive power over prize actions. The
grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction in Article III of the Con-
stitution was truly intended to be exclusive for prize proceedings, as
these were never "saved to suitors" and concurrent state courtjurisdic-
tion under the judiciary Act of 1789. Prize proceedings were paradig-
matic civil law actions proceeding solely in rem. And, as even those
that advocate the narrowest ambit of federal admiralty jurisdiction ac-
knowledge, 56 the Framers were unanimous in their belief that prize
proceedings had to be heard solely in federal court in order to ensure
the consistent treatment of these cases which so profoundly impli-
cated delicate issues of national security.
The Adopters of the Eleventh Amendment could not, therefore,
have admitted to the possibility that states making claims to disputed
prizes would demand that these be heard in state court. It would not
have been inconceivable in 1795 to believe, as the Constitution itself
allowed, 357 that some states would have naval forces operating during
wartime. Some of these vessels might have even made captures of en-
emy ships or cargoes on the high seas, or at least made a claim to prize
moneys. The exclusion of admiralty actions from the text of the Elev-
enth Amendment was, at a minimum, a recognition that the Adopters
did not believe that the states could erect a defense of sovereign im-
munity in such cases and direct that such cases be heard in state prize
tribunals.
But was the exclusion of admiralty meant to do more than that? I
think it was, and the answer to the riddle lies, I believe, in the under-
standing developed in this Article about in rem actions involving sov-
ereigns. One of the points I have made here is that many judges and
scholars have embraced erroneous views about the nature of sover-
eign immunity in admiralty. Beginning with Justice Waite in The Fidel-
ity, and continuing with justice Pitney in The Queen City, and
culminating with justice White in Treasure Salvors, the assumption has
been advanced that in the English Admiralty the Crown enjoyed total
immunity in in rem proceedings. But, as I have sketched here, 58 this
was not true. And although I acknowledge that the historical evi-
354 3 U.s. (3 Dall.) 54 (1795); see supra Part II.C.
355 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809); see supra Part IIIA.
356 See, e.g., Casto, supra note 28; Clark, supra note 39, at 1332-60; see also supra Part
I.B.
357 See U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
358 See supra Part IA.
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dence is incomplete, I think (if anything) it leans towards a conclu-
sion that the English Crown was often compelled to litigate claims to
property in admiralty in rem actions.
I am mindful, of course, that a doctrinal revolution overtook the
common law of sovereign immunity in the nineteenth century. It
would, indeed, make little sense to argue that sovereign immunity in
admiralty should be frozen at 1787 or 1795. That is not, however, my
submission here. Rather, it is that even as doctrines of immunity grew
and expanded to further insulate all levels of sovereignties (foreign,
national, state, and municipal) from court interference, there always
remained common law exceptions which permitted courts to hear in
rem actions involving sovereign claims.
The combined rules of The Siren, The Davis, and The Fidelity per-
mitted in rem actions when the sovereign itself initiated the action (as
in prize, bankruptcy, or forfeiture), or when the res subject to the
arrest was not in the "actual possession" of the state, or was not being
used for "public and governmental purposes." Moreover, the hold-
ings of these late nineteenth century cases may well have reflected the
realities of sovereign immunity in the Framing period. The holding
in the Moitez case, 59 where the Pennsylvania Admiralty court denied
an in rem libel for unpaid mariner's wages against a sovereign vessel,
is fully explicated under the rule of The Davis and The Fidelity: the sov-
ereign vessel was in the actual possession of the State of South Caro-
lina and used for public purposes.
But even more important than the historical pedigree of these
judge-made exceptions to the judge-made law of sovereign immunity
is that they were explicitly embraced in the locus classicus for the Elev-
enth Amendment bar of in rem actions involving states: the Supreme
Court's 1921 decision in The Queen City.3 60 And, yet, as has been ex-
plained here, later courts simply decided that Justice Pitney did not
mean it when he wrote that the Eleventh Amendment bar on federal
court jurisdiction only "exempt[ed] public property of a State used
and employed for public and governmental purposes."361
The results in most of the recent shipwreck cases are thus doubly
wrong. As already noted, it is error to permit states to demand (and
receive) Eleventh Amendment immunity without first proving some
colorable claim to the res. It is wrong, moreover, to believe that states
have any immunity to lose where the property at issue in an in rem
359 Moitez v. The South Carolina, 17 F. Gas. 574 (Pa. Adm. 1781) (No. 9697); see
supra Part I.B.
360 The Queen City, 256 U.S. 503 (1921); see supra Part IV.C.
361 The Queen City, 256 U.S. at 511.
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libel is not in the actual possession of the state (or its officers) or not
used solely for public purposes. Shipwrecks, by their very nature, fail
such a test and one could imagine other species of maritime property
that would as well.
It is, therefore, possible to imagine that the Adopters of the Elev-
enth Amendment would have been comfortable with the proposition
that in some forms of in rem libels the states could seek immunity,
while in others they could not. The distinction, as implicated in the
text of the Eleventh Amendment itself, is whether the suit is actually
one being "commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States. '3 62 In rem libels in admiralty could, depending on the nature
of the maritime lien being enforced or the nature of the property
being arrested and brought within the jurisdiction of the federal
court, ensnare important interests of state sovereignty. That is pre-
cisely the reason that the common law of federal sovereign immunity
worked out such differences in the jurisprudence of such cases as The
Davis and The Fidelity.
There is also a point to be considered, first advanced by Justice
Washington in Bright, that in enforcing in rem remedies, "the court
need not depend upon the good will of a state claiming an interest in
the thing to enable it to execute its decree. '8 63 This was precisely the
same observation made by Justice Miller in The Davis: if an admiralty
court could acquire in rem jurisdiction over an object without dis-
turbing the actual possession of the sovereign, sovereign immunity
could not possibly be offended.3 64
In short, the common law of federal sovereign immunity in admi-
ralty recognized that there had to be limits on the claims made by
government in insulating itself from judicial power. And, as I have
charted here, these limits were directly incorporated into the doctrine
of state sovereign immunity as superimposed on the textual silence of
the Eleventh Amendment. These limits were respected by courts for
the first 130 years of the Republic.
In contrast, today's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence respects
no bounds to claims of state sovereignty. States lay claim to property
they do not actually possess and which is not used in governmental
service and still insist that such cases not be heard in federal court.
State officials, acting under color of state law, interfere with individu-
als' ownership or enjoyment of property in violation of federal law
and still claim immunity from suit in federal court. And what is the
362 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
363 United States v. Bright, 24 F. Cas. 1232, 1236 (C.C.D. Pa. 1809) (No. 14,647).
364 See The Davis, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 15, 20-21 (1869).
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basis of this extraordinary surge in state authority drawn at the ex-
pense of the power of the federal courts? It is a hybrid construction of
the Eleventh Amendment that has filled textual holes (whether they
concern admiralty actions or suits involving federal questions) with
judge-made notions of sovereign immunity.
What has been considered in this Article is the extent to which
the intent of the Adopters, as manifested in their expectations as to
state sovereign immunity, has been largely ignored in the new Elev-
enth Amendmentjurisprudence. By using admiralty as a an example,
it is manifest that different values and desires prevail today in employ-
ing the Eleventh Amendment as the critical constitutional provision
regarding federalism. And, as has just been made clear by the
Supreme Court in Seminole, the Eleventh Amendment (through its ju-
dicial gloss) is not just a doctrine reflecting judicial rectitude, an un-
derstandable reluctance to allow federal courts the power to interfere
with state government. Rather, state immunity from federal court ju-
risdiction is a bedrock principle of federalism which Congress itself is
powerless to alter, save in very narrow contexts, circumstances that
may well be restricted further over time.
The issue, it seems to me, is as Judge Mehrtens put it in his opin-
ion in the Treasure Salvors case: can states use the Eleventh Amend-
ment as a "sword... [to] take and appropriate the property and lives
of its citizens without due process."3 65 And, if it seems extravagant to
argue that treasure salvage cases implicate such profound concerns,
then one might instead reflect on whether states can interpose claims
in federal bankruptcy or forfeiture proceedings and thereby divest
federal court jurisdiction in favor of their own tribunals. Outlandish?
That is precisely the result we now have with the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence post-Seminole. When one starts to consider, there are
many forms of action that proceed in rem. Based on the admiralty
precedents, states seem free to enter the legal lists by presenting
claims to disputed property.
So what we have in the Eleventh Amendment today is a judge-
made doctrine drawing sustenance from a history that never was.
Texts are always drafted with certain understandings made and writ-
ten, with others reflected and yet unwritten. As the detailed doctrinal
expectations that gave rise to the Eleventh Amendment were forgot-
ten, its jurisprudence was released from the bonds of the text itself as
well as from the intent of the Adopters. So much so, that, as far as
365 Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel,
459 F. Supp. 507, 528 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
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admiralty is concerned, many decisions granting states Eleventh
Amendment immunity today are simply living a constitutional lie.
